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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v.- . . .: 
EDGAR TIEDEMANN, : Case No. 20080471-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (2008). Appellant Edgar Tiedemann was convicted and sentenced for two 
counts of murder, both first degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995), 
and one count of attempted murder, a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-
5-203 and 76-4-101 (1995). The judgment is attached as Addendum A. (R. 937-39). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to strike a 
veniremember for cause. 
Standard of Review: Dismissing a prospective juror for cause is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. "When reviewing such a ruling, we reverse only if the trial 
court has abused its discretion." State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); accord, State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 343-44 
(Utah 1993). The exercise of discretion must be viewed "cin light of the fact that it is a 
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simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror 
and selecting another.'5' Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 (quoting Jenkins v. Parrish. 627 P.2d 
533, 536 (Utah 1981)). 
Preservation: The issue was preserved in the record at 970:28-34. 
B. Whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence statements that 
Tiedemann made in connection with a pre-Miranda interrogation conducted by police. 
Standard of Review: This Court will review a trial court's determination about 
custodial interrogations for correctness. See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, f^l[ 4-5, 144 P.3d 
1096 (stating that "the important policy of promoting uniformity" in police 
administration of Miranda warnings "mandates greater appellate involvement"). 
Preservation: The issue was preserved in the record at 804-814 and 966:27-30. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are set forth at Addendum B: Utah R. Crim. P. 18 
(2008); U.S. Const, amends. V, VI, and XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
In November 2002, the State charged Tiedemann with three counts of murder 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995), stemming from events that occurred in 
November 1991. (R. 1-5). On October 6, 2003, the trial court bound Tiedemann over 
for trial. (R. 99). In December 2004, Tiedemann filed a motion to suppress statements 
made during a police interrogation in November 1991, and a motion to dismiss the 
charges based on the State's destmction of evidence in 1993. (R. 246-267; 388-403; see. 
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also R. 337-358). The trial court denied both motions. (R. 585-595; 599-607). 
Tiedemann petitioned for interlocutory appeal (see e.g. R. 598, 608-610), and the 
Utah Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the trial court's rulings in part and 
remanded for further proceedings. (R. 659-683); see_ State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 
162 P.3d 1106. Thereafter, Tiedemann filed additional pre-trial motions in the trial court, 
including a motion to suppress statements made to police when they asked questions 
without first advising Tiedemann of his rights per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). (See R. 804-814). The trial court denied that motion in part. (See R. 865-66). 
On February 21, 2008, the state filed an amended information for two counts of 
murder, and one count of attempted murder. (R. 867-69). On February 22 and 25, 2008, 
the trial court began trial proceedings with jury questionnaires and voir dire. (R. 879). 
During those proceedings defense counsel made a for-cause challenge against Juror No. 
19, Ms. English. (See R. 970:28-34). The trial court denied the challenge. (Id?) 
On February 26, 2008, the trial court gave the jury instructions, and the parties 
presented arguments and evidence. (See R. 888-89). The trial continued on February 27 
and 28, and at the conclusion, the jury rendered a guilty verdict on each count as charged. 
(R. 890-91; 895-96; 897-99). On May 2, 2008, the trial court sentenced Tiedemann to 
consecutive prison terms, which may be for life, for each count of murder; and to a prison 
term of one to fifteen years for attempted murder. (R. 937-39). On May 28, Tiedemann 
filed a notice of appeal. (R. 947). The appeal is timely. See Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4 
(2008). Tiedemann is incarcerated. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 2, 1991, Deborah Pryor called police to report that three people had 
been shot at a West Valley trailer home (see R. 969:64-65), and she reported that the 
suspect was at a nearby gas station. (See R. 969:145-46). As police approached the gas 
station, they had emergency lights engaged and Deborah in the car. (R. 969:66, 128, 145-
46). Deborah pointed to Tiedemann as the suspect. (R. 969:66, 146). Officers got out of 
their cars, shouted commands at Tiedemann, and drew their weapons. (R. 969: 139, 146-
47). Officer Stinson testified that when Tiedemann removed his hands from his pockets, 
he had a gun in each hand. (R. 969:147-48). Stinson ordered Tiedemann to drop the 
guns and to lie on the ground. (R. 969:147-48). He complied. (R. 969:135). 
Stinson approached Tiedemann and handcuffed and "secured him." (R. 969:148). 
He then straddled Tiedemann and asked "what was going on." (See R. 805-06). 
Tiedemann responded that he "killed three people, Chuck, Susy [sic] and Scott." (Id.) 
Stinson asked where the shootings had taken place, and Tiedemann gave an address in 
West Valley City. (Id.) Officers then searched Tiedemann, and as they took him to the 
car, he stated he "shot them because they had burned him on a drug buy of $6,000." (R. 
806; 969:148). Also, he stated he had been "sniffing glue since he was a young boy." 
(R. 806; 969:148). Officers later admonished Tiedemann per Miranda and interviewed 
him a second time at the police station. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ^ 2-3. 
Prior to trial, Tiedemann asked the court to suppress pre-Miranda statements made 
at the arrest scene. (See R. 804-814; 966:27-30). The trial court denied the request in 
part. (R. 966:30). In February 2008, the case went to trial. (See R. 879). 
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During jury selection, the defense asked the court to strike a potential juror, Ms. 
English, after she revealed that she had worked at the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office 
transporting in-custody inmates to court. (See R. 970:28-33). The defense maintained 
that given Ms. English's background and experience - her knowledge of the policies and 
procedures for in-custody inmates and her presumed knowledge of Tiedemann's in-
custody status at trial - she should be stricken for cause. (R. 970:32-33). Her knowledge 
was inherently prejudicial to Tiedemann. It violated the presumption of innocence and 
Tiedemann's rights to due process. (See id.) The trial judge denied Tiedemann's 
challenge (R. 970:34), and Tiedemann was forced to cure the trial court error by using his 
own peremptory strike on Ms. English. (See Jury List, attached to the inside flap of 
volume 3 of the pleadings files). 
After the trial court empanelled the jury, the State presented its evidence. Deborah 
Pryor testified that on November 1, 1991, she, her husband Chuck, her sister Susie, and 
her nephew Scotty stayed overnight with Tiedemann in his trailer home. (R. 969:29). 
Sometime after dinner, they watched television then all went to bed. It was 12:00 or 
12:30. (R. 969:34). Deborah smelled paint thinner in the trailer. (R. 969:34-35). She 
testified Tiedemann was inhaling it. (R. 969:34). 
Shortly after Deborah and her husband fell asleep in the spare room, she was 
awakened by a loud noise. (R. 969:36-37 (stating she heard a loud pop)). Thereafter, 
over the next few hours, she continued to lie in bed as Tiedemann paced back and forth in 
the trailer and fired several shots, including four shots into the spare room. (R. 969:37-
43, 73). After a while, Tiedemann told Deborah to "get up. I know you are not dead." 
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(R. 969:43). He was holding a gun. (R. 969:44). Deborah and Tiedemann went into the 
living room (R. 969:45), and Tiedemann retrieved a second gun from his pants pocket. 
(R. 969:54). Also, Tiedemann continued to inhale a lime-green substance from a glass 
jar. (R. 969:48-50). 
According to Deborah, Chuck was dead (R. 969:40); Scotty was conscious, but 
bleeding and paralyzed (R. 969:46-47, 75); and Susie was covered with a blanket. (R. 
969:50). Tiedemann pulled the blanket down and Deborah could see that she had been 
shot in the right eye. (R. 969:51). 
Deborah was able to leave the trailer later that morning when she told Tiedemann 
she knew where to get cocaine. (R. 969:55). Together they drove to a convenience store 
and gas station while Deborah purportedly made telephone calls about drugs. (R. 969:56-
61). After making calls at the gas station, Deborah left Tiedemann and drove to the home 
of acquaintances, Pat and Tony. (R. 969:61-63). When she reached their home, she ran 
inside and told them to call 911. (R. 969:63-65, 111). Pat gave the phone to Deborah 
and she reported the shootings. (R. 969:64-65). Police arrived shortly thereafter and 
transported Deborah to the gas station to identify Tiedemann. (R. 969:65-66). 
The State also presented evidence from officers and agents who investigated the 
trailer and Tiedemann. Specifically, officers testified that they went to the trailer and 
forced their way inside. (R. 969:97-98, 175-77). They dispatched medical personnel for 
Scotty, who was still conscious (R. 969:99, 101-02, 105, 161-62), and they confirmed 
that Chuck and Susie were dead. (R. 969:99-100). Officers investigated and recorded 
the scene (R. 971:12-15, 61-66). Also, they interviewed Tiedemann and Deborah at the 
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police station. (R. 971:66-77). After the interrogations, they returned to the trailer to 
assess the scene in light of Tiedemaim's confessions (R. 971:77-79), and to collect 
evidence (R. 971:65-66) that was later destroyed. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, \\ 8-9. 
In addition, medical examiner Maureen Frikke testified that she investigated the 
scene and conducted autopsies on Susie and Chuck. (See R. 971:21-25). According to 
Frikke, Susie suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the head. (R. 971:23-25, 26). And 
Chuck suffered three gunshot wounds, including a fatal shot to the chest. (R. 971:28-30, 
32). A second medical examiner, Edward Leis, testified to the injuries that Scotty 
suffered in November 1991, including a gunshot wound to the right eye and at least two 
gunshot wounds to the chest. (R. 971:42-43). 
After the State presented its case, Tiedemann testified. (See R. 972:6). He 
acknowledged that after Susie, Scotty, Chuck and Deborah arrived at his home on 
November 1, 1991, he went to his room to "sniff[]" paint remover and he continued to 
"sniff[]" it throughout the evening to get "high." (R. 972:8-9). He testified that he was 
awakened in the night when he heard arguing and a loud noise. (R. 972:10 (stating the 
noise was gunfire)). He got up and encountered Deborah "running down the hall." (R. 
972:11). She "lobbed" a gun at him and told him to "[l]oad it up." (R. 972:11). He 
complied. (R. 972:12). He then handed the loaded gun to Deborah and picked up a 
"long-barrel .22 out of the ammunition box." (R. 972:12-13). 
As Tiedemann walked down the hall, he passed the spare room and saw Chuck 
covered in blood. (R. 972:13). He went to Susie, and saw no visible signs of life. (R. 
972:13-15). Also, Scotty was covered in blood. (R. 972:14). As Tiedemann stepped 
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over Scotty, he asked, "why did you shoot me?" (Id.) Tiedemann was horrified. (Id.) 
He walked back down the hall to Deborah and asked "Why did you do this?" (R. 
972:15-16). Deborah said nothing. (R. 972:16). At some point, Deborah and Tiedemann 
decided to leave; he wanted cocaine and she wanted heroin. (R. 972:19). Also, 
Tiedemann wanted to get help for Scotty. (R. 972:19). Tiedemann described driving to 
make phone calls (R. 972:19-26), meeting a dealer for heroin in a park (R. 972:23, 24-
25), waiting at the gas station while Deborah went for cocaine and the authorities to help 
Scotty (see R. 972:26-28), and the police encounter at the gas station. (R. 972:28-29). 
Tiedemann acknowledged that he made confessions to the police. (R. 972:29-35). 
He acknowledged a history of inhaling toxic substances (R. 972:35-37; see also R. 
972:43-44 (acknowledging that inhaling substances would probably cause brain 
damage)); he acknowledged spending time at the hospital recovering from a stroke (R. 
972:37-39); and he talked about his sexual relationship with Susie (R. 972:40-41). He 
testified that he did not shoot Susie, Chuck or Scotty, but he made confessions to police 
because he "wanted to die." (R. 972:42). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Tiedemann guilty as charged. 
(R. 972:77-79). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
For the first issue, the defense asked the trial court to remove Juror No. 19, Ms. 
English, from the jury for cause on the grounds that her employment with the Salt Lake 
County Sheriffs Office and her involvement in and knowledge of transporting in-custody 
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inmates denied Tiedemann his rights under the Due Process Clause. Based on Ms. 
English's personal experiences she would know that Tiedemann was in-custody thereby 
undermining the presumption of innocence. Although the trial court had enough venire-
members to seat an unbiased jury, it rejected Tiedemann's challenge and required him to 
exercise one of his peremptory strikes to remove Ms. English from the panel. The trial 
court's ruling was in error. Tiedemann suffered prejudice: He was denied a substantial 
right in that he was not allowed the same number of peremptory strikes to use on 
prospective jurors as the prosecutor, because he was required to cure trial court error with 
use of his peremptory strike on Ms. English. Tiedemann respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court ruling and remand the case for a new trial. 
For the second issue, the trial court erred when it denied a motion to suppress 
statements made by Tiedemann in connection with a pre-Miranda interrogation. 
Specifically, officers engaged in questioning designed to elicit incriminating statements 
without first giving Tiedemann the opportunity to invoke or waive his rights per Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Officers expressly interrogated Tiedemann at the scene 
of the arrest while Tiedemann was in police custody, handcuffed and held at gunpoint. 
The officers knew or should have known that the questions were likely to elicit 
incriminating statements. Thus, Tiedemann's statements were coerced. The statements 
should have been suppressed. Tiedemann asks this Court to reverse the trial court's 
ruling and to remand the case for a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 
TIEDEMANN'S CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE WITH RESPECT TO JUROR 
NO. 19, MS. ENGLISH. 
A. A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO BE TRIED BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 
IN ADDITION, A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A FAIR TRIAL AND THE 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. 
1. The Impartial Jury, 
The state and federal constitutions provide that a defendant is entitled to a trial by 
an impartial jury. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. In support of that 
right, parties participate in voir dire where they are given the opportunity to question a 
potential juror to determine whether he or she has any prejudice or bias that may interfere 
with that juror's ability to decide evidentiary issues "fairly and objectively" or to apply 
"objectively the rules of law given to the jury by the trial judge." State v. Saunders, 1999 
UT 59, Tf 44, 992 P.2d 951. Ultimately, the trial court is responsible for safeguarding the 
defendant's right to an impartial jury. See State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); see also State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 319 (Utah 1977) (stating it is the duty 
of the trial court to see that the constitutional right to an impartial jury is safeguarded). 
When a prospective juror's statements in voir dire raise a question of bias, a 
challenge for cause may be made pursuant to Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
A trial court has discretion in granting a challenge for cause. Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442. 
However, the exercise of discretion "must be viewed 'in light of the fact that it is a simple 
matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and 
selecting another.'" IcL (quoting Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536); Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^  51 
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(recognizing the ease with which an issue of bias "can be dispensed by the simple 
expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open to 
question"); see also State v. McCoy ey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (recognizing 
that an abuse of discretion results when the trial court fails to properly consider the law); 
State v. JoliveU 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986) (stating discretion is within the limits 
prescribed by the law). 
2. The Defendant's Right to a Fair Trial and the Presumption of Innocence. 
Next, the defendant is entitled to the presumption of innocence and to a fair trial. 
See U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process); Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7, 12 
(identifying guaranteed rights). He is entitled to have a jury determine his guilt or 
innocence based solely on the evidence and not on circumstances "not adduced as proof 
at trial." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, \ 20, 40 P.3d 611 (citation omitted). In that 
regard, a defendant is entitled to the "physical indicia of innocence" at trial. Kennedy v. 
CardwelL 487 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir. 1973), cert, denied. 416 U.S. 959 (1974). The 
indicia of innocence include the right of a criminal defendant to be tried in front of a jury 
in the "garb of innocence," rather than in prison clothing. See Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 
341, 344 (Utah 1980) (stating that the "prejudicial effect that flows from a defendant's 
appearing before a jury in identifiable prison garb is not measurable, and it is so 
potentially prejudicial as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a 
criminal trial"). In addition, a defendant is entitled to be tried without being "shackled, 
chained, bound, handcuffed, gagged, or otherwise physically restrained." State v. 
Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing numerous cases supporting a 
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defendant's right not to have the jury exposed to security measures directed at him). 
Likewise, the defendant may not be judged based on his "custody" status. See 
Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (stating that a defendant is entitled to have 
"his guilt or innocence determined solely" on the evidence and "not on grounds of 
official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as 
proof at trial") (citation omitted). In Holbrook, the United States Supreme Court 
considered a trial court's use of several uniformed officers during defendants' trial. The 
defendants maintained that the presence of the officers suggested to the jury that the 
defendants were of "bad character." IcL at 563. Based on the circumstances of the case, 
the Supreme Court disagreed. It stated that generally a jury would not conclude from the 
presence of officers that a defendant is dangerous or culpable. IcL at 569. Indeed, jurors 
may draw a number of inferences - unrelated to the defendant - as to why officers are 
present. IcL (stating jurors may believe that officers are there to guard against courtroom 
disruptions or tense exchanges). The Court refused to adopt a presumption that the "use 
of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inherently prejudicial." IcL Instead, it 
preferred a "case-by-case approach" to the matter. IcL 
Also, it indicated that under certain circumstances the presence of uniformed 
officers may create an impermissible factor at trial: for example, if jurors are aware that 
courtroom security measures are directed at a defendant and his custody status, that may 
be inherently prejudicial. See icL at 569, 570 (defining the question for review as whether 
the action was "inherently prejudicial"). In that instance, the Court would assess whether 
the courtroom conduct presented "an unacceptable risk" of an impermissible factor at 
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trial. Id. at 570 (citation omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied the Holbrook standard. In State v. Daniels, 
it ruled that "when a courtroom action or arrangement is challenged as inherently 
prejudicial, we consider whether the practice presents an unacceptable risk of bringing 
into play impermissible factors that might erode the presumption of innocence." 
2002 UT 2, f 20 (citations omitted). Also, the court considers "whether the prejudicial 
practice is outweighed by any competing essential state interests." LL 
B. SINCE JUROR ENGLISH KNEW POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ABOUT 
IN-CUSTODY SUSPECTS AT TRIAL, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
STRICKEN HER FROM THE PANEL FOR CAUSE. 
1. If a Juror's Answers Indicate Bias, the Juror May Be Stricken for Cause. 
In considering whether a trial court should have stricken a prospective juror for 
cause, an appellate court will apply a two-part test: first, the court will decide "whether 
the trial court committed legal error" when it failed to strike the prospective juror; and 
second, it will decide "whether the trial court's failure to strike the prospective juror[] 
prejudiced [the defendant]." See State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, \ 24, 24 P.3d 948. For the 
first part of the analysis, Rule 18 states that a challenge for cause "may be taken" when a 
juror has demonstrated "[cjonduct, responses, [a] state of mind or other circumstances 
that reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially." Utah 
R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14). Under that provision, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
questions of bias arise when a juror reveals information indicating strong or deep 
impressions, "which will close the mind against the testimony that may be offered" or 
which will combat "testimony and resist its force." State v. Julian, 11X P.2d 1061, 1064-
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65 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah 1988) (stating 
"strong and deep impressions" serve as a basis for disqualification) (citation omitted). 
The rule considers each case based on the circumstances. 
In the following cases, Utah courts refused to disqualify a prospective juror simply 
because he or she had a career in law enforcement. These cases are distinguishable. 
In State v. Cobb, 11A P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989), the defendant challenged the trial 
court's failure to remove for cause a prospective juror who had served as a police officer 
and had indicated that although he had made arrests, he believed he could be fair and 
impartial. IcL at 1127. The prosecutor and defense counsel both asked several questions 
of the prospective juror, and his answers "reflected] that he was willing to keep an open 
mind and apply the law as the court instructed." Id_ Consequently, the court affirmed the 
trial court's refusal to dismiss the juror for cause. Id. at 1127-28. 
In State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court when it refused to remove a prospective juror who had served as an Army 
officer and was responsible for drug and distribution investigations. Id. at 25-26. The 
juror stated unequivocally that he would look at the case impartially. Thus the court 
ruled that although a juror's statements of impartiality may lose their meaning in light of 
other facts suggesting bias, in this case, "there [were] no additional facts in the record 
that suggested] [the juror] had an impression so strong and deep as to constitute bias." 
Id. at 26. 
In State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 
1993), this Court considered whether a former highway patrol officer should have been 
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dismissed for cause. IcL at 1222. In individualized questioning, the officer's statements 
showed that he would not close his mind against the evidence in the case. IcL at 1223. 
The trial court had asked several "careful" questions and uncovered no bias. M Thus, 
any inference of bias had been rebutted and the trial court had not abused its discretion in 
failing to remove the juror. IcL_\ see also State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 151-53 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (ruling that prospective juror's prior employment as a police dispatcher did 
not justify striking him for cause). 
The above cases support that notwithstanding the individual's experience in law 
enforcement, he or she could remain impartial as a juror in a criminal trial. Cobb, 714 
P.2d at 1127; Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26; Gray, 851 P.2d at 1222-23. However, if a 
juror's responses in voir dire raise an inference of bias, the trial court must remove the 
juror or ask additional questions in an effort to rebut the inference. See West v. Holley, 
2004 UT 97, f 14, 103 P.3d 708; State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 49, 55 P.3d 573; 
Wach, 2001 UT 35, f 27 (citing State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988)); see also 
Salt Lake City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing the trial 
court made "significant efforts" to determine if potential juror could be unbiased). 
In addition, if the trial court asks follow-up questions and the prospective juror 
makes conclusory statements about her ability to decide the case fairly, those statements 
may not be sufficient to overcome the inference. See Calliham, 2002 UT 86, Tf 49 
(stating a potential juror's subsequent statement "that she can be impartial will not of 
itself attenuate an inference of bias" arising from earlier statements); Wach, 2001 UT 35, 
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K 33 (stating "[i]t is not enough if a juror believes that he or she can be impartial and 
fair"); Woolley, 810 P.2d at 445 (stating an inference of bias generally is not rebutted "by 
a subsequent general statement" that the juror "can be fair and impartial"). 
Likewise, a prospective juror's ambiguous or equivocal responses are not suf-
ficient to rebut the inference. See Calliham, 2002 UT 86, Tf 51 (stating juror's ambiguous 
and contradictory statements were "insufficient to rebut the inference of bias"); see also 
Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (Advisory Committee Note) (stating, "[ajlthough thorough 
questioning of a juror to determine the existence, nature and extent of a bias is 
appropriate, it is not the judged duty to extract the 'right' answer from or to 'rehabilitate' 
a juror"). If a prospective juror provides conflicting or equivocal responses, she should 
be excused from the panel. See, e.g., Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f^ 51. 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that trial courts should be liberal in 
granting for-cause challenges where prospective jurors have demonstrated an actual or 
perceived bias. It has stated that "trial judges should err on the side of caution in ruling 
on for-cause challenges and that the scope of judicial discretion accorded a trial judge 
must be evaluated in light of the ease with which all issues of bias can be dispensed by 
the simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is 
not open to question." Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 51 (citing Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536); 
State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997) (stating, "We acknowledge and agree with 
the concurring and dissenting opinions in encouraging trial judges to heed the direction 
that we have already given them to grant for-cause challenges when bias is shown") 
(citing State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 649-50 (Utah), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 858 (1995)); 
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Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 (recognizing it is a simple matter to obviate a problem of bias 
by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another) (citation omitted); Depew v. 
Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, f 11, 71 P.3d 601 (recognizing a trial court's discretion in 
failing to strike a prospective juror is "most broad" when questions to jurors have no link 
to potential bias, it "narrows" when voir dire questions have a possible link to bias, and it 
disappears when "questions go directly to the existence of an actual bias") (citation 
omitted). 
In this case, Juror No. 19, Ms. English, revealed information supporting an in-
ference of bias. Even when the trial court asked follow-up questions, her answers failed 
to rebut the inference. Juror English should have been stricken from the panel for cause. 
2. Ms. English Disclosed Information During Voir Dire that Specifically 
Interfered with Tiedemann 's Right to the Presumption of Innocence. 
In considering whether a trial court should have removed a veniremember for 
cause, this Court will "look to the entire voir dire exchange" relating to that prospective 
juror. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^  47 (citing State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ^  58, 20 P.3d 
342). In this case, prospective Juror No. 19, Ms. English, disclosed during voir dire that 
she worked with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office for 20 years. (R. 970:28-30; see 
also Envelope entitled "Jury Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire No. 19). She worked 
in the jail and as a transportation officer "bringing inmates to court" until 1989, and then 
at that point, she became a court liaison officer until she retired from the sheriffs office 
in 1995. (See R. 970:28-30). Her duties included guarding inmates in the court holding 
cells, transporting them to and from the underground facilities "in the old court building", 
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and sitting "in on the court hearings" and a couple of trials. (R. 970:28-29). Ms. English 
did not "get any of the high-profile" cases. (R. 970:29). Also, she was familiar with 
policies and procedures for transporting defendants. (R. 970:29). 
Ms. English's 62-year-old husband also worked with the sheriffs office before 
retirement, and they both worked with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (R. 
970:28). Ms. English was familiar with an agent at Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association due her employment with the sheriffs office. (R. 970:29 (stating she knew 
Joey Finnochio)). She believed her work with the sheriffs office would influence the 
way she evaluated evidence. She stated, "I think it would [influence me] because of the 
fact that I wouldn't be in awe of it as much as I would if I [had] been a civilian." (R. 
970:28). Also, she stated, "I would be able to evaluate [the evidence] more clearly." (R. 
970:29). Stated another way, Ms. English believed that due to her training as an officer, 
she was in a better position to assess and weigh evidence for the truth. 
The defense moved to strike Ms. English for cause due to her past association with 
the sheriffs office and her personal information and knowledge concerning 
transportation policies and courtroom conduct for in-custody inmates. (R. 970:32-33; see 
also, e.g., supra pp. 11-13, herein). Since such information was specifically known to a 
juror, it would constitute an inherently prejudicial and impermissible factor at trial. See 
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ^J 20, 23-24 (recognizing that courtroom practices aimed at the 
defendant but not necessarily known to a juror may not be inherently prejudicial; also 
recognizing that certain conditions in the courtroom may create an impression in the 
minds of jurors about defendant's in-custody status); see also Holbrooke 475 U.S. at 569 
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(refusing to presume that use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inherently 
prejudicial, but acknowledging that juror awareness of security measures aimed at the 
defendant may create prejudice). Also, such a factor would violate due process and erode 
the presumption of innocence. (R. 970:32-33); see Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567 (stating 
that central to the right to a fair trial is the right to have guilt or innocence determined on 
the basis of the evidence and not "on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued 
custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial"). 
The prosecutor opposed striking Ms. English because jurors "shouldn't be 
surprised]" that "a defendant charged with more than a count of murder would be under 
supervision of bailiffs." (R. 970:32). After argument on the matter, the trial court denied 
the request to strike Ms. English (R. 970:34), even though striking her would have been a 
simple and straightforward remedy. See, e.g., State v. King, 2006 UT 3, If 17, 131 P.3d 
202 (recognizing the ease with which an allegation of juror bias may be remedied); 
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^ 49; Baker, 935 P.2d at 510 (stating, "We acknowledge and 
agree with the concurring and dissenting opinions in encouraging trial judges to heed the 
direction that we have already given them to grant for-cause challenges when bias is 
shown") (citation omitted); Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 (stating it is a simple matter to 
obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting 
another) (citation omitted); (see also R. 970:28-34, attached hereto as Addendum C). 
Under the circumstances, the trial court's refusal to strike a juror - who had 
personal information and knowledge about in-custody defendants — constituted an 
unacceptable and unjustifiable risk on a defendant's due process rights. See, e.g., Daniels, 
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2002 UT 2, Tf 20 (recognizing that when courtroom actions create an inherent prejudice, 
the court will assess whether the actions present an unacceptable risk of impermissible 
factors at trial, and it will assess the state interest for the actions); see also Saunders, 
1999 UT 59, Tf 37 (recognizing that jurors may be "strongly influenced" by their "own 
experiences and points of view and the possible biases" that arise from them); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 18(e)(14) (stating a challenge for cause may be taken where a prospective juror 
has disclosed circumstances that reasonably lead to the conclusion that she may not act 
impartially); (Addendum D, identifying several other potential jurors for the panel). 
In addition, in response to further questioning, Ms. English maintained that her 
training as an officer would allow her to view and assess the evidence with more clarity 
than "a civilian" jury member. (R. 970:28-29). That statement supports that Ms. English 
would not be impartial in her approach to the evidence, but would give more credence to 
an officer's ability to evaluate information for the truth. Those answers were insufficient 
to rehabilitate her for impartiality. See, e.g., Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 51 (stating that 
"ambiguous and contradictory statements were insufficient to rebut the inference of 
bias"); Woolley, 810 P.2d at 445 (stating inference of bias generally is "not rebutted 
simply by subsequent general statement" that the juror "can be fair and impartial"). 
Under the circumstances, Ms. English's personal knowledge was not only 
inherently prejudicial to Tiedemann and his right to a fair trial {see supra. Argument 
I.A.2., herein), but also, Ms. English indicated a preference for an officer's ability to 
assess the facts and arrive at the truth. (See R. 970:28-29). Those circumstances leave a 
strong impression about Ms. English and her inability to be impartial. See Utah R. Crim. 
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P. 18(e)(14). The trial court should have excused Ms. English for cause. See_ id_ Since it 
failed to remove her, it abused its discretion and acted beyond the limits of reasonability. 
3. The Defense Was Forced to Remove Ms. English from the Panel with Use of a 
Peremptory Challenge. 
Because the trial court refused to strike Ms. English for cause (R. 970:34), defense 
counsel was required to exercise a peremptory strike against her. (See Jury List, attached 
to the inside flap of volume 3 of the pleadings files, and attached hereto as Addendum D). 
Inasmuch as the peremptory strike was exercised in that fashion, the issue is properly 
before this Court on appeal. Baker, 935 P.2d at 507 (recognizing that defendant's use of 
a peremptory strike to remove a biased juror preserved the issue on appeal). 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT THE FOR-CAUSE 
CHALLENGE CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
when a trial court has erred in failing to strike a prospective juror for cause, the defendant 
must show prejudice. I<L at 400 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)); see also Utah R. Crim. 
P. 30(a) (2008) (recognizing that error which does not affect "the substantial rights of a 
party" shall be disregarded); Baker, 935 P.2d at 507 (stating defendant may be entitled to 
reversal if he can show actual prejudice), l 
Under the Menzies analysis, the defendant must show that he faced a "partial or 
biased jury," or "the jury was made more likely to convict" as reflected in voir dire. 
l The Menzies decision overruled Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), 
and its progeny, which allowed for automatic reversal in cases where a defendant was 
required to use a peremptory strike to remove a veniremember that the trial court refused 
to remove for cause. Id. at 1092. 
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Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400; Wach* 2001 UT 35, ^  36 (stating the analysis focuses on the 
empanelled jury). According to the court in State v. Wach, if the defendant lost the use of 
a peremptory challenge because the trial court failed to remove a juror for cause, the 
defendant would have to show that "as a result of the loss of his peremptory challenge he 
was not able to remove another subsequently summoned juror who ultimately sat on the 
jury, and who was c"partial or incompetent."'" Wach, 2001 UT 35, f^ 36 (citations 
omitted). In addition, the defendant would have to show that he objected to that seated 
juror. Id at 1ffi 38, 39.2 
In this case, Tiedemann did not claim that jurors, who were empanelled, were 
2 In Wach, the defendant maintained he was prejudiced because he intended to use his 
peremptories on other veniremembers, who sat on the jury after he used the peremptory 
strikes to cure trial court error. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^ j 37. The Utah Supreme Court 
refused to consider that prejudice analysis because Wach did not specifically object to the 
other veniremembers who sat on the jury. IcL at ^[ 38, 39. Yet under the law, a 
defendant is not required to make on-the-record objections to jurors that he has planned 
to remove with peremptory strikes. Indeed, the rule states that for a peremptory strike, 
"no reason need be given" for removing a prospective juror. Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d) 
(emphasis added). 
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated: 'The essential nature of the 
peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry 
and without being subject to the court's control. While challenges for cause permit 
rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of 
partiality, the peremptory [challenge] permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality 
that is less easily designated or demonstrable." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 
(1965) (emphasis added; internal citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Also, "[t]he value of peremptory challenges is 
that they are intended and can be used when defense counsel cannot surmount the 
standard for a cause challenge. Requiring the defendant to show actual bias - the standard 
applicable to cause challenges - for the forced expenditure of a peremptory challenge 
renders the separate statutory grant of peremptory challenges totally meaningless." 
Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 100 (Fla. 2004). 
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biased or incompetent. (See R. 970:46 (passing the jury "for cause")); see also Harding 
v. Bell 2002 UT 108, \ 17, 57 P.3d 1093; WacK 2001 UT 35, \ 24. Nevertheless, he 
maintains that the trial court's error in failing to strike Ms. English was prejudicial. 
Specifically, under Utah law, a defendant is expected to cure trial court error by 
expending his own peremptory strike - without compensation - against the challenged 
juror (see State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, ^ 7 n.l, 122 P.3d 895 (stating defendant 
must cure trial court error with a peremptory strike)), while the prosecutor is allowed her 
full quiver of peremptory strikes to use as she sees fit. Consequently, when the trial court 
errs in failing to strike a juror for cause, its action impacts on the number of peremptory 
strikes remaining for the defendant. That is, the defense has fewer peremptory strikes to 
use than the prosecutor. That uneven allocation of a resource controlled exclusively by 
the trial court results in harm. See Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 102 (Fla. 2004) (stating 
"[t]he harm suffered by the defendant under such a scenario is having been forced to 
accept a juror he or she would have peremptorily excused but for the need to remedy the 
trial court's error"); Holtzrave v. Hoffman, 716 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 
1986) (stating that a litigant is entitled to a "full panel of qualified jurors before making 
peremptory challenges"); see also State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (stating defendant failed to show prejudice when he argued that trial court error 
resulted in an uneven allocation of peremptory challenges). 
Tiedemann was deprived of the full number of peremptory strikes because he was 
forced to use a strike to cure trial court error (see Jury List, Addendum D, hereto), while 
the State was not required to use a peremptory strike in that fashion, but was free to shape 
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the jury to its advantage. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d) (allowing each side the same 
number of peremptory challenges); Baker, 935 P.2d at 507 (recognizing defendant must 
use available peremptory strike to remove biased juror). 
That is a substantial deprivation. See e.g., Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989) (defining the prejudice prong as error that is "of sufficient 
magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party") (citations omitted); Carrier v. 
Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 354-55 (Utah 1997) (recognizing that Menzies does 
not address the situation where there has been a misallocation of peremptory challenges); 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (stating the peremptory challenge is "one of 
the most important of the rights secured to the accused") (cite omitted), overruled on 
other grounds by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Farias v. State, 540 
So.2d 201, 203 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (stating "[i]t is error for a court to force a party to 
exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons who should be excused for cause since it 
has the effect of abridging the right to exercise peremptory challenges"); U.S. Const, 
amend XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process of law). 
Tiedemann's loss of a peremptory strike in this case prevented him from using the 
strike on other jurors. For example, Juror No. 8, Don Dalling, was the victim of a 
robbery and theft where someone broke into his home and stole his car. (See R. 970:11-
12; Envelope entitled "Jury Questionnaires," Juror/Questionnaire No. 8 at 4). 
Under Utah law, that disclosure may not be sufficient to support a for-cause 
challenge. See State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 22, 153 P.3d 804 (stating "[t]he 
simple fact that a potential juror may have ties to law enforcement does not establish 
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bias," and "[t]he same is true of a potential juror whose family member has been the 
wnations omitted); Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26. However, the 
disclosures were sufficient to raise a question of bins ti ir the defense h» use a peremptory 
strike against Dalling. See, e.g., Utah R. Crim P S(J; instating that for a peremptory 
strike u"no i\dstHI need I»e given"); Saunders, ] rv- rTT c ° . ^ 48-51 (stating aprospective 
juror's prior experience as a viclitn of „i en • * .Li::, ..-.. ..1,1: MO juror 
should have been removed); State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 823 (Utah Ct. App ! M«M I 
(slating a question of bias arises when prospective jurors have been victims of crime). 
overruled on other gntwids * * :) * •" s ^ .-1 -: •, vioolley, . . ..... ,d 4-1- -48 
(stating the trial court erred in failing to strike a veniremember, who '• • '..:"•••> 
of a crime); £<?<? a/so Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, f^ 29, 71 P.3d 601 (stating one 
purpose rf voii -IIH" I 1O ill • parties In v r\U\\ inlonnation lor peremptory challenges); 
State vLeleae, 1999 UT App 368, \ 22, 993 P.2d 232 (same i. 
Although Juror Dalling did not "believe" that his experience as a victim of crime 
v\ * - : ._ . J . \\. . :iiai ambiguous and 
conclusory statement was not sufficient to over: v, *.. r-. - • • 
striking him from the panel with a peremptory challenge. See_ Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 
-
 J
 ,1J'JALJ • * ' [^ " p^sonal experience likely would make him 
predisposed to testimony against the defendant. See_ Saunders. : K- ' ! € 7 
(recognizing that jurors may be strongly influenced by their "own experiences and points 
f vk \v .uid Ihe pussible biases" that arise from those experiences). Indeed, Dalling's 
experience likely made turn more ^vmpathenc to a purported viaun of crime. 
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The State's case here hinged on the credibility of an alleged victim, Deborah 
Pryor. Yet Deborah's credibility was tarnished by her own history of drug abuse. (See 
R. 969:78). When officers transported her to the station for a statement, they discovered 
a makeup kit with heroin paraphernalia in her purse. (R. 969:89-90, 136-37). Even 
though Deborah tried to claim that the makeup kit belonged to Tiedemann (R. 969:90, 
136-37), evidence showed that it belonged to her, and she used it on the morning of the 
shootings (R. 972:25), raising questions attrial about her integrity. 
In addition, Deborah's statements implicating Tiedemann appeared to be self-
serving. The record supports that when officers questioned Deborah about the shootings, 
they repeatedly promised they would not pursue drug charges against her. (R. 971:89-
91). Under the law, when a person makes incriminating statements against another in an 
attempt to curry favor with authorities, those statements "lack trustworthiness." State v. 
Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Likewise, the record supports that Deborah was not forthcoming with officers in 
her statements. For example, she left officers with the impression that when she left 
Tiedemann at the gas station, she drove to a random house to report the shootings, and 
the occupants there were strangers. (R. 969:155, 158). Yet other evidence supported that 
Deborah knew the occupants, Pat and Tony (see R. 969:84-85); and they were drug sup-
pliers. (See R. 969:116). In this case, the jury was advised that in judging witness credi-
bility, it may consider "the apparent frankness or lack of frankness of the witness." (R. 
905). In that regard, a witness who lacked frankness may not be believed. (See, e.g., id.) 
Also, evidence supported that Deborah may have fired or handled the guns in the 
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trailer on November 2, 1991. Specifically, agent Kevin Smith confirmed gun residue on 
Tiedeniann,, i 'liu*. k, SUSK., .inJ Debo.\..: • .-• • ^ Qmith testified that a person 
may be exposed to residue if, among other things In* «n iAic lur, lired a w cu\u w\ i H 
handled it after it was fired. (R. 971:50, 57-58). In this case, Smith could not say where 
tin* residue earn • livm I ihiTl kmr.. A it came from the person who fired the weapon, 
someone handling die weapon. 1 don't kiiuw ihe M miee if'1 *'"'! ^ " i Slated another 
way, gunshot residue evidence on Deborah suggested her involvement in the shootings. 
]\ .-,•>. -v LI;C Mate presented evidence that Tiedemann confessed to the 
shootings, other evidence raised niu->i-.- *= • » •„; he 
confessions. (See, e.g., infra, Argument II., herein). Specifically, the defense cstah1. 
A sic:^ mie. , ie\\ ed [ icdemann for confessions while he was intoxicated.
 v . 
971:83-84); Tiedemann. 2:» -- * .-\ :.»* UL •:. . ». . iedemann was 
"intoxicated at the time [of the interrogation] and [he] was later luui- ' * > 
to stand irhi ; hcers acknowledged that under those circumstances, the statements 
made rliinri ' (he iiifermwitini il times were erratic 11''. ' I ;H -^S /). Also, after the 
officers interviewed Tiedemann, they returned to the trailer m srnnini 'e ibe scene to 
match their conclusions to the intoxicated confessions. (R, 971:66-79). Officers and 
agents tl len destn »\ \^\ ill the ph vsiee . \ .v-ence and were left only with their reports and 
conclusions about the investigation for trial. See Tieclenhimu -:-' ?7 ' : :*: ** ~ )-
In sum, the evidence raised doubts and concerns about Deborah's credibility and 
integrity, ami (he circumstances surrounding Tiedemann's intoxicated confessions. 
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Notwithstanding, the jury rendered its verdicts in less than four hours. (See, e.g., R. 
972:76-77). In that regard, Dalling's experience as a victim of crime likely predisposed 
him to Deborah's testimony and had an influence on the jurors for the results. This case 
supports the determination that the trial court should have stricken prospective juror 
English from the jury panel due to her personal knowledge and experience with criminal 
defendants in legal proceedings. (See supra, Argument I.B., herein). If the trial court 
had stricken English, Tiedemann would have been able to use his peremptory strike 
against another juror, for example, Dalling who made disclosures raising questions of 
bias. There is a reasonable likelihood that removing Dalling, a victim of crime, from the 
panel would have tipped the balance in Tiedemann's favor. Since the court failed to 
strike English, Tiedemann was forced to do so, and he was deprived of a substantial right. 
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (stating that a peremptory challenge "is 'one of the most impor-
tant of the rights secured to the accused'") (citation omitted). That supports prejudice for 
a new trial. See Verde, 770 P.2d at 122 (defining prejudice prong as error "of sufficient 
magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party") (citations omitted). 
II. THE INTERROGATION AT THE SCENE OF THE ARREST WAS A 
PER SE VIOLATION OF TIEDEMANN'S RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." U.S. Const, amend. V. In order to 
preserve that right, the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), established a series of warnings that officers must provide to a suspect before 
engaging in an interrogation. IcL at 467-73 (stating a suspect must be advised that he has 
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the right to remain silent, anything he says can be used against him, '•• - 1 - - :i= ";-L' I 
attorney, and an attorney will be provided if he cannot afford to retain one). 
The Court recognized that if nffn vrs fail d- pnn ak warnings, any statement the 
suspect makes in connection with an interrogation may not be used b\ *" "-••••••• * 1. 
fa al 444-4X 4 S- J(); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (stating "Miranda 
safeguards come • • • - -. - i , *-jected to either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent"). Indeed, "an accused's pm-Miranda statin-, ^r-; 
b^ ; : Guinea ; w.^ntarv due to the coercive nature of custodial interrogations." State v. 
Ustimenko * ' ::mg Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298,305(1985)). 
In considering whether a suspect's statements should have been suppressed for 
lo i • *' Miranda wwv .. - a dements: first.whether the suspect was in 
custody or deprived of his freedom in a significant * \ »• • - • . • = • • -
 :. , .;• -
statements were elicited during officer interrogation. See, e.g., State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, 
][ (•*' : ' . LA-}±a* ~ '• f "" ^ (recognizing that the analysis invoh ;> a 
"custody" and an "interrogation" elenvM a >*ce also btaic v. A-Ju'Ljiici, e>~r i-.„u • ;a ">7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating Miranda warnings are triggered by "custodial 
•*•• - ' I ' I T . ;. r"(^  . . ^0); Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 12?'. 
1214-15 (Utah A-p. 1091); Shite v. Sampson, so8 IJ U I I nil, I MM |( ''iah f 'I, , .j.),, 
cert, denied, 817 v.ld 327 (I tah \ WW cert, denied* 117 L.Ed.2d 507 ^ t ) i p ! •' ' 
.-'cnuHi, ;^ person is in custody when '[the person's] freedom of action is curtailed 
to a degree associated with h n'ni.il * [^siLL, ' • .ootnote and 
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citations omitted); see also State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(identifying factors for determining whether a person is in custody). 
For the second element, "[interrogation is 'either express questioning or its 
functional equivalent' and it incorporates any ' words or actions on the part of police 
officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response.5" Low, 2008 UT 58, ^  70 (citing, inter alia, Levin, 2006 UT 50, |^ 37); see also 
Levin, 2006 UT 50, \ 34 (stating that "custodial interrogation consists of questioning or 
use of other techniques of persuasion 'initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken inlo custody . . . ") (footnote and citations omitted); State v. Ferry, 2007 
UT App 128, ^ | 13, 163 P.3d 647 (stating interrogation refers to "express questioning" or 
"its functional equivalent"). In that regard, follow-up statements and exclamations have 
qualified as interrogation where the suspect is in custody. See, e.g., People v. Matthews, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 756, 763-64 (Cal. App. 1968); Harrvman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 873 (5th 
Cir. m0), cert, denied, 101 S.Ct. 161 (1980). 
A. TIEDEMANN WAS IN CUSTODY WHEN OFFICERS CONDUCTED AN 
INTERROGATION AT THE SCENE OF THE ARREST AND WITHOUT THE 
BENEFIT OF MIRANDA WARNINGS. 
Tiedemann made incriminating statements in this case on two separate occasions. 
The first occasion was at the scene of the arrest (see R. 805-807), and the second 
occasion was at the police station. See Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, Tflf 48-56 (addressing 
admissibility of statements made at the police station). This issue concerns statements 
made on the first occasion, at the scene of the arrest. 
According to the uncontested police reports, officers placed Tiedemann in 
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significant restrictive custody to curtail his actions immediately upon encountering 
(ACC K. VOO:~V defense counsel represented - and the prosecutor did not dispute -U it 
the officers lacked an hii15 - l.'m '** >i! - iw: ^ v' ^ . r« .:ie apprehension of 
Tiedemann; thus, the parties relied on facts contained in police reports) K T!v.: • h.i ] ~ 
emergency lights engaged, they drew their weapons and trained them, on Tiedemann, they 
surrounded m. •' ' . :. * • i •<;-. see also K. Hi*
 : 46-48 
(stating that officers immediately reacted upon encountering Tieden i < •n < K sec JISO 
Levin, 2(»« n- \ "-^  36, 39 (recognizing four factors to support that a suspect is in 
custo«l\ iiirliiding (he siU1 H (In; inteiTu^itliuit, whclhcr (he investigation was focused on 
the accused, whether the objective indicia of arrest were prcscul, jm I (lv lenylh uiul I rui 
of the interrogation; also recognizing that "indicia of arrest" include "handcuffs, drawn 
weapon , 'lorkn I ilnnis tlnv.ns, m conuoii ) ( footnotes and citations omitted); U.S. v. 
Miller, 722 F.Supp. 1, 5-6 (W.D.N.Y. 1 9 b * ' " ^ n - • 'i • •''<>-' -
defendant was in custody). Officers then handcuffed and secured Tiedemann. (R. 805). 
r ' :act> .i:^ i! • •. vii. .o support the first element of the analysis: Tiedemann was in 
custody and he was "deprived oi V: '^ < .-. TIL ;n ^ Ynranda, 
384 TT.S. at 444; Levin, 2006 UT 50, ffif 36, 39 (identifying factors for "determining 
w;'v- •- : defen : i :n custody'"). 
Next, the analysis considers whether incriminating statements w ere "the product 
of interrogation." Levin, 2006 UT 50, % 37. To that end, the question is "whet: - -
- vc viiicers l^i- *UK* .UI\ e known that their words or actions were likely to elicit an 
incriniiik:-'^ n> • -•••• 1 . :;i,; s- vi.^uic.'i ;ne wwxis or actions 
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themselves, their meaning, and their likely impact." Id. 
According to the police reports, Officer Stinson stood above Tiedemann and he 
asked "what was going on." (R. 805-06). Tiedemann responded that he "killed three 
people, Chuck, [Susie], and Scott." (R. 806). Stinson asked where the shootings 
occurred and Tiedemann gave an address in West Valley City. (R. 806). Tiedemann 
then provided additional information, which Stinson relayed to police dispatch, and 
officers searched Tiedemann. (R. 806). The encounter continued as follows: 
At this point, Mr. Tiedemann also told the officers that he had heroin in his 
pocket. Officer Stinson saw a small piece of plastic on the ground underneath 
where Mr. Tiedemann had been and asked Mr. Tiedemann if that was the heroin. 
Mr. Tiedemann responded that it was. 
Officer Stinson then secured Mr. Tiedemann for transport to the station and 
was walking Mr. Tiedemann to Officer Yurgelon's police cruiser when he stated 
that "he had shot them because they had burned him on a drug buy of $6,000." He 
also stated that he had been "sniffing glue since he was a young boy." Before 
leaving, Officer Yurgelon again asked Mr. Tiedemann the address where the 
shootings had taken place and he gave them the address again. 
Sometime later, Mr. Tiedemann's hands were uncuffed for a Gun Shot 
Residue test. At this point, Mr. Tiedemann told the police that he "had both guns 
in my hands." He also said he "had the .22 over here" and shook his left hand and 
that he had "the .38 over here" shaking his right hand." 
(R. 806-07). 
At a pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled that some of 
Tiedemann's pro-Miranda statements would be suppressed, and some statements would 
be admissible in evidence at trial. (See R. 966:30, attached hereto as Addendum E). 
Consequently, at trial, Stinson described approaching Tiedemann, giving him commands, 
securing him and walking him to the police cruiser. (R. 969:146-48, 150). In addition, 
when the prosecutor asked if Stinson asked Tiedemann any questions, he answered, "Not 
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at that time, no/5 (R. 969:148; but see R. 969:152 (Stinson confirmed that he had to rely 
< • • . • • : • . . . , ,-,: . ;\ - ••- ' . < speciivmg iiiut use reports showed that Stinson 
asked questions at the scene)). Stinson then testI f e\ : • . . . . , - ^ .• J . • , 
the police car, [Tiedemann"! stated that he had shot them because they had burned him on 
a _*; ..^ ' - : iv - ••'.£•/. : auii
 t;c u been sniffing glue since he was a young 
boy. And all this was just spontaneous." R '^v uv ) . 
In this case, Officer Stinson opened the door to a custodial interrogation at the 
seen nfthr un ::( .v i UH »u( the benefit ol Miranda warnings. He engaged in conduct and 
made statements that he "should have know«" w< * i :• .....'L.M;;L i i u ^ om 
Tiedemann. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^ 37 (emphasis in original); (R. 805-06 (reflecting that 
S• n«>-. Mi VV.-'L-UHJ;; ..inc nanueitJ ICJ i iedemann while he was on the ground and then asked 
"what was poir." ^r, "x • h e • ^-.*. * . < > > . . • - ;:ig| tnree people"; 
also Stinson asked follow-up questions and Tiedemann made additional stater/v-v -
Specifically, Stinson initiated an illegal interrogation as he secured Tiedemann. 
(R. 805-'-<* i *i • ' • . J : . ... ^.nciied ] iedemann and 
walked him to the patrol car as Tiedemann gave additional information 1 1 ia1 1 he < officer 
noiL-a. \uL) bunion's words and actions constituted one continuous event that was 
ii * -- ' *• ' •*. >- ... - \ / IM, '«•' - -i • —;-;- K^pt the door of interroga-
tion open, prompting Tiedemann to make statements - about *! dm* =t >L^  jr. :, ,. lhg 
"glue" (id.) - as part of the ongoing encounter. See_ Levin, 2006 UT 50, )\ 39 (stating the 
an •! *- • * e. . \ . • .^, actions, their meaning, and their likely impact). 
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Tiedemann's statements that "he had shot them because they had burned him on a 
drug buy of $6,000" and he had been "sniffing glue since he was a young boy" (R. 806; 
969:148) are in direct response and relationship to Stinson's initial question, "what was 
going on," and follow-up questions about where the shootings occurred. (R. 806). 
Tiedemann's statements are pertinent only in the context of Stinson's questioning, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the prosecutor elicited the statements from Stinson at trial 
only after providing initial context about the shootings. (See R. 969:145 (reflecting 
Stinton's testimony at trial that "three people had been killed and [] the person who had 
done the shooting was" up the street)). Thus, the record supports the second element of 
the analysis: incriminating statements were made in connection with the interrogation 
without the benefit of Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Levin, 2006 UT 50, fflf 34, 37 
(recognizing the second element requiring Miranda warnings). The trial court erred in 
admitting the statements into evidence at trial. 
B. THE ERROR IN ADMITTING VKE-MIRANDA STATEMENTS AT TRIAL 
WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
An involuntary confession violates fundamental principles underlying the criminal 
justice system, and results in constitutional error. 
[Cjonvictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are 
involuntary, Le^ the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot 
stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because 
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the 
enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an 
inquisitorial system - a system in which the State must establish guilt by evidence 
independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against 
an accused out of his own mouth. 
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (citations omitted); see also U.S. 
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Const, amend XIV, § 1 (ensuring due process). The violation here warrants reversal 
unless tl ic State can si IOW tl lat the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State 
v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah l ^ . n ; , . .u- • •• * JL: . ;nt 
standard, the Court must determine "whether the State has met its burden of 
demonstrating tl lat tl le adi: — .^i. wi iiu„, confession" "did not contribute to [the 
defendant's] conviction." Arizona v. h'ulminante, 4'W I I S 2'/[K 2()5-{){) \ i{){) I i In other 
words, the side which benefited by the error (the prosecution) must show beyond a 
reasonable doubi dial (he error did not contribute to the verdict (or sentence) obtained." 
State v. Young < *53 P. VI ?- ' ' ! "' ' : ,l- - . .>. 
Also, for constitutional error, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
A number of factors determine whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, including "the importance of the witnesses] testimony in the prosecution's 
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the 
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall 
strength of the prosecution's case." 
State v. VillarreaL vWv / ^. - •. -V-V) (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). Tn ibis case, the 
error in admittir; *' • --Miranda ^:z---^ -• •!- .• .^..-icv. °-,:>, prejudicial ioi the 
following reasons. 
First, evidence of a confession is powerful. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296 
(statin*J "V**.1 /<M -^U.' *> • \ ». ".wessons have [a] profound 
impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt 11 In • H I r\" ^  I i h i I i I \ I | n 11 
them out of mind even if told to do so." IcL (citation omitted). 
[A full confession] may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching 
its decision. In the case of a coerced confession siich as that given by [the 
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defendant] to [the government informant], the risk that the confession is 
unreliable, coupled with the profound impact that the confession has upon the jury, 
requires a reviewing court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the 
admission of the confession at trial was harmless. 
Id. Indeed, certain evidentiary errors have a pervasive influence on the trial, "altering the 
entire evidentiary picture" (State v. Hales* 2007 UT 14, | 86, 152 P.3d 321) and the trial 
strategy, including whether and the defendant will testify, and the overall defense 
presented in the case. Since confession evidence is profound, Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 
296, its erroneous admission has a pervasive influence. 
Second, confession evidence may allow the jury to make inferences where the 
physical evidence is lacking. In this case, the State was unable to present primary 
physical evidence at trial because the physical evidence was destroyed. See_ Tiedemann, 
2007 UT 49, Tffi 8-9. The physical evidence included "two revolvers, a Code R kit, a 
victim's wallet, heroin, an audio tape, a blood specimen, a make-up kit, drug 
paraphernalia, various items of victims' clothing, bedding, a bone fragment found on one 
victim's bed, a bottle of green liquid, a one gallon can of Toluene, .38 and .22 caliber 
bullets, bullet fragments, shell casings, hair and saliva samples, and gunshot residue from 
Tiedemann and one of the victims." IcL at | 8. After the destruction of evidence, the 
State was left with statements from Deborah Pryor, who was in the trailer at the time of 
the shootings (see R. 969:29-55), and investigative reports, photos and files prepared by 
state agents, who were not witnesses to or present at the shootings. (See R. 969:96-106, 
126-180; 971 (reflecting evidence from state agents and officers)); see also Tiedemann, 
2007 UT 49, \ 9 (identifying secondary reports and files as the remaining evidence). 
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Deborah testified that early in the morning on November 2, 1991, Tiedemann -hot 
h< i InisK'inil ( liuck, her sister Susie, and her nephew Scotty, but he did not shoot her. 
(See R. 969:37-55). Deborah's ercdibilih was in question, \nu)iig inner things, the 
defense established that she had her own history of drug use and abuse (see R. 969:78, 
!-' J . •" * .i. made statements against Tiedemann only after officers promised not 
to pursue drug charges ar;r i-.* ^ -r • H < k ' • •;; . ^ uwn, • • -,i a; 5V~I 
(recognizing that it a witness makes incriminating statements against another lo emi 
1 i .iLiiiK.-nties, the statements lack trustworthiness)); and she was not entirely 
forthcoming wiih ofjV. • « • > -.i-..^-. e^fc?> c, ^ ., ,. . - ^ i - - recognizing that 
Deborah did not reveal that she knew Pat and Tom.): see alsn R. ()*J5 • n \ • .' . :*ic_ 
that il a witness lacks frankness, the jury may take that into consideration in assessing 
State officers and agents testified that they col! - • ] * vnw-v, *• *• '*• * 
Tiedemann and Deborah. They acknowledged that Tiedemann was intoxicated during 
the inteirugjtiuu, ami I In \ t un^idercd his responses to questions at times to be erratic. 
(R. 971:85-87). In addition, they obtained statements fiorn I k-boiah implicating 
Tiedemann in the offenses only after they made promises not to file charges against her. 
I !•'"; i ) r i -.s^-'Ml), Notably, Hie olticers returned to the trailer to match their investigation 
and conclusions to the intoxicated ci^.fV^i. • i- • : ' ' -IUH^L- r-* --"-- - nuv :^), 
Given the overall concerns with Deborah's testimony and the questions 
..L:IL; me investigation, Vinson's testimony about the pro-Miranda confession was 
imporian ' "'-.• ••>«-. ,- .Vc I tiiarreai, :^y r.^vi 4->. lo (Mating the 
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prejudice analysis considers several factors including whether the witness's testimony 
about the confession was important to the case, and the overall strength of the 
prosecutor's case). Based on a review of the record and the circumstances here, the 
inadmissible prz-Miranda statements tipped the balance against the defendant. The 
violation warrants reversal since the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
Edgar Tiedemann respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
ruling as it relates to a for-cause challenge against a prospective juror, and to evidence of 
pre-Miranda confessions. Also, Tiedemann requests that this Court remand the case for a 
new trial. 
SUBMITTED this W day of fo<,c^*«^ 2008. 
Linda M. Jones (f 
Heidi Anne Buchi 
Patrick Coram 
Heather Brereton 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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C E R T I U C A l L O i DELIVERY 
i •.-. ,\. . ' , \ .^ , iicivr-v , c; L i \ that T have caused to he hand-delivered an original and 
7 copies of the lorer- r«i i . * [ • . . - 'inn Male Strceh 5!n Floor, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and 4 copies to the Attorney General's Office ; I. ; > •-
. ... i ..:._!... .)•. I I\A 300 South, 6th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this V S 
day of b e c t - ^ - o ^ , ~> -\S. 
? rm^u 
LINDAM. JONES / 
V 
DELIY! r-'l-h' . * -vjiicja. i r u c e and the l-iah Court of 
Appeals as indicated above this day of , 2008, ; 
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remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its pe-
remptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining 
jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any al-
ternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If al-
ternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless oth-
erwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are to try the 
cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory 
challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted. At the direction of the 
judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine chal-
lenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the end thereof The judge may 
and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall pro-
vide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall 
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining 
jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any al-
ternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If al-
ternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless oth-
erwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by computer, 
the clerk may call the jurors in that random order. 
l 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court 
may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by such further in-
quiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional ques-
tions requested by counsel or the defendant. Prior to examining the jurors, the court may 
make a preliminary statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or their attor-
neys to make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of tri-
al. . ' 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(c)(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the trial of a 
particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned 
and may be taken by either party. 
(c)(l)(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the 
procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the 
panel. 
(c)(l)(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and shall be in 
writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
grounds of the challenge. 
(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing may be 
had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, 
and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is allowed, 
the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge 
is denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(c)(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A chal-
lenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, 
except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but be-
fore any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to chal-
lenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be taken 
first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. 
In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases 
each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is 
' 2 • • • • • 
entitled to three peremptory ehallenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may 
allow the defendants additional peremptory ehallenges and permit them to be exercised 
separately or jointly. 
(c) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard and de-
termined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be examined as a 
witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on one or 
more of the following grounds. On its own motion the eourt may remove a juror upon the 
same grounds. 
(e)(1) Want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law. 
(e)(2) Any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of performing the 
duties of a juror. 
(e)(3) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be in-
jured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted. 
(e)(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between 
the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or 
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to 
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a ver-
dict which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified sole-
ly because the juror is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision the-
reof 
(e)(5) Having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having 
complained against or having been accused by the defendant in a criminal prosecution. 
(e)(6) Having served on the grand jury which found the indictment. 
(e)(7) Having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the particular of-
fense charged. 
(c)(8) Having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and whose ver-
dict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was submitted 
to it. 
(e)(9) Having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act 
charged as an offense. 
(c)(10) If the offense charged is punishable with death, the juror's views on capital pu-
' 3 
nishmcnt would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties as a 
juror in accordance with the instructions of the court and the juror's oath in subsection 
(h). 
(c)( 11) Because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or interested 
in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying on of which is a viola-
tion of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense. 
(c)(12) Because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on the 
preliminary examination or before the grand jury. 
(c)(13) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the de-
fendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged. 
(e)(14) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the 
court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, 
if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and will act impartially and fair-
iy. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense 
alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges arc 
taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate jurors, in the order 
in which they arc called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to con-
sider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution 
and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror 
to be chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected at the same time and in the same manner, 
shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and chal-
lenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, and privileges 
as principal jurors. Kxccpt in bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who does not re-
place a principal juror shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict. 
The identity of the alternate jurors may be withheld until the jurors begin deliberations. 
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in substance, that 
they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and 
render a true verdict according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
| Amended effective November 1, 2001; November 1, 2007.) 
4 
U.S. Const. Amend. V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time 
of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall cibridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
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PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I don't think so. 
THE COURT: All right, thanks. 
Good morning, and thank you for being here. The 
attorneys may have a couple follow-up questions for you. I 
will just defer to them. 
MR. COLBY: You indicated that you were retired from 
the sheriff's office. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes. 
MR. COLBY: What was your job there? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I worked in the jail and I worked 
as a transportation officer, bringing inmates to court, and I 
worked at the end as the court liaison officer, coordinating 
the courts with the people that are in custody. 
MS. BUCHI: When did you retire? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: In 1995. 
MR. COLBY: What about working for ICE? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: ThatTs my husband. And he works 
part time there. He is also retired sheriff's office and works 
part time. 
MR. COLBY: Would the fact that both you and your 
husband are retired from the sheriff's office have an influence 
on the way you would evaluate evidence in this case? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I think it might, yes. But I 
think it would be because of the fact that I wouldn' t be in awe 
25 I of it as much as I would if I would have been a civilian, I 
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think. 
MR. COLBY: Do you think you would be able to 
evaluate the evidence fairly and make a deteimination based 
solely on the evidence you had been presented? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I think I would be able to 
evaluate it more clearly. 
MR. CORUM: How involved were you in transportation? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I would guard the inmates, it was 
in the old court building, and guard the inmates in the holding 
cell. I would transport them to and from in the underground. 
I sat in on the court hearings. I only sat in on a couple of 
trials. Most of thena were all settled before it ever went to 
trial. Plus I didn't get any of the high-profile ones, being 
my boss viewed me as being a little helpless because I was a 
female. So I didn't get to take Bundy or any of those guys to 
court. 
MR. CORUM: You are aware of the policies and 
procedures? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes. 
MR. CORUM: You stated you knew Joey Finocchio and 
his brother Rocky. How well do you know them? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I worked 20 years with Rocky. I 
know Joey because he was involved a bit with the law 
enforcement. But I donTt know Joey nearly as well. I just 
know him more as RockyTs brother. 
29 
MR. CORUM: If Joey was to testify in this case would 
you have any tendency to believe his testimony or disbelieve 
his testimony because of your relationship with him? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, I donft have any opinion of 
what his proclivity for truth is. I don't know him that well. 
It wouldn't make any difference to me. 
MR. CORUM: You know his brother pretty well. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes. 
MR. CORUM: Are you still in contact with Rocky? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No. When I retired I pretty much 
hibernated. 
MS. PETERS: When you retired in ! 95 is that the last 
time you had worked with jail transportation? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I know I stopped working with 
transportation quite a bit sooner, I guess it was five or six 
years before that they made me court liaison officer. It was 
'90 or maybe !89 that I was court liaison officer. 
MS. BUCHI: You responded to the question about any 
member of your family being the victim of a crime, that your 
father was a victim 30 years ago of a kidnapping. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah. My sister was dating a kid 
and had a child by him, that had a problem with alcohol and 
drugs and so forth. And my father kind of hid my sister from 
him. And he broke into the house one day and tried to get my 
father to tell him where she was hiding out. He since has 
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cleaned up his act, and the charges were dropped, it wasn't 
really that he took him, he just made him get in the car, 
wanted to show him where my sister was hidden out at. 
Actually, one of his sons is — I guess has been at my house. 
So I mean, you know, I have a nephew, his father and things 
seem to have evened out and so forth. My father was deceased 
shortly after that from cancer, so he is not around to 
influence anything or even — I almost forgot about it, to tell 
you the truth. It is so far in the past it is something almost 
like somebody else's story. 
MS. BUCHI: Is there anything about anything in that 
experience that you feel would have an effect on your ability 
to be an impartial juror? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I donft think so. "When it 
happened I removed myself from the jail when he was arrested. 
I was in charge of the shift at that time. I removed myself 
from it. At the time I was upset, because I just heard they 
were bringing him in for that, and I didn't know any of the 
details or anything like that. But, no, I don't think so, not 
anymore. It has been too long past, 
MS. BUCHI: You did not indicate by name that you 
knew Mr. Teidemann. As you see him today do you recognize him? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No. 
MS. BUCHI: You donTt remember him? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No. In fact, I don't remember 
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the name, either, of any of the people. 
THE COURT: Okay, thanks. 
MR. CORUM: I guess the concern we would have is just 
knowledge of transportation procedures. I know, I think the 
officers here do a very good job with that, but I think over 
the course of a week it is going to be obvious that somebody is 
sitting in the courtroom guarding Mr. Teidemann. They do tend 
to stick, out a little bit. Maybe for a lay person to come in, 
chances are lessened that they are going to under stand that. 
But I think this person would pick up on it immediately, quite 
frankly. They do tend to stick out a little bit, though they 
try not to. The other stuff, I don't know. 
MS. BUCHI: The other stuff, I don't see as an issue. 
But the transport and the fact that he will be being 
transported. 
THE COURT: I think that the jurors are going to — I 
think all the jurors are going to assume something like that, 
or at least hope that's the case, based on these charges. I 
just don't think — 
MR. COLBY: It shouldn't be surprising to them that a 
defendant charged with more than a count of murder would be 
under supervision of bailiffs. 
MR. CORUM: Due process requires we not let anybody 
know he is in custody. 
MS. BUCHI: Certainly, she is going to know. It is 
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not going to be a thought or maybe. She is going to know. 
MS. PETERS: She is familiar with the old courthouse 
system, too. It could have changed since then. There is going 
to be a lot of people in this courtroom. I don't know if they 
are doing what they are supposed to be doing, which is paying 
attention to the presentation of the evidence, they are not 
going to know this. It is not like when we are trying a 
forgery trial and there is one guy sitting in the back with a 
suit. I think there is going to be a lot of people sitting in 
the courtroom intermixed. 
MS. HRERETON: I think based on her former job being 
a transport officer from the jail, she is going to have no 
doubt Mr. Teidemann is in custody. I think any of us would 
know that, walking in a courtroom, hands down. I think someone 
who has actually held the job of doing transport is going to 
know that. The concern is despite the fact that everyone would 
assume or hope someone charged with these crimes is in custody, 
due process does require that that not enter into it, and I 
think that's a problem. 
MR. COLBY: I think it is like Ms. Peters said, there 
is going to be a lot of people in the courtroom, and it won't 
be immediately obvious to anyone what the defendant's custodial 
situation is. 
MS. PETERS: She said in light of her working there 
she could be fair and impartial, and it would have no effect on 
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her, and she retired in f95. 
THE COURT: I think she is okay. Deny the for cause. 
Good morning, thank you for being here. You are 
juror No. 20. There was one question that you didn't answer, 
and it was, "Have you formed an opinion about the defendant's 
guilt or innocence as a result of what you have heard, read or 
seen." Is that an oversight? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, because I haven't heard or 
seen, I don't know anything about it other than what you said 
in the court. 
THE COURT: Is your answer no, you haven't formed an 
opinion? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I haven't formed an opinion. 
THE COURT: Any questions from any of the attorneys? 
MR. CORUM: No. 
MR. COLBY: I don't have any. 
THE COURT: Thank you for being here. Could you sign 
the back sheet of your juror questionnaire? 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Is that all? 
THE COURT: That's it. The attorneys may have some 
questions. 
MR. COLBY: I had one question. There was a question 
on the form that asked if you had any medical condition that 
may make it a hardship for you to serve on the jury. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No. I have tennis elbow, but 
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• A TRADITION O F QUALITY • 
1 context of clearly, if Mr. Tiedemann testifies and testifies 
2 to something other than--
3 THE COURT: Of course. 
4 MR. CORUM: --I did it, then all of this comes in, 
5 spontaneous and otherwise. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 Regarding the motion to suppress, the specific 
8 finding is that all statements made by the defendant to 
9 Officer Stinson were after he was in custody; therefore, the 
10 rules governing custodial interrogation under Miranda and 
11 subsequent cases do apply. 
12 I'm granting the motion that any statements made in 
13 response to questions are to be suppressed. If there are 
14 spontaneous statements within that, those can come in. 
15 I caution you, though, Mr. Colby, Ms. Peters, that 
16 it may be difficult for you to walk that very fine line. 
17 Just--we don't know much and I'm relying on the 
18 representations made by defendant's statement of facts that 
19 may or may not be supported by the memory of the officer. But 
20 I would be cautious in eliciting that testimony, but will let 
21 it in if it was spontaneous. 
22 Then motion to exclude discussion of alleged sexual 
23 assault. I am granting that motion. 
24 Motion to exclude irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial 
25 portions of confession with regard to references to being 
30 
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OPINION 
[**1098] DURRANT, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution protects against self-incrimination. l To 
preserve this right, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
defendants subjected to custodial interrogation are 
entitled to a Miranda warning.2 Where such a warning is 
not given, any incriminating statements made by a 
defendant during the custodial interrogation are excluded 
from evidence. 3 We granted certiorari in this case to 
clarify the standard of review to be applied by a Utah 
appellate court in reviewing a trial court's decision on 
whether a defendant was subjected to custodial 
interrogation. 
[***2] 
1 U.S. Const, amend V. 
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436, 86 S. 
Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 
3 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US. 291, 297, 300-
01, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L Ed. 2d 297 (1980); 
Miranda, 384 US. at 444-45; Salt Lake City v. 
Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). 
[*P2] Following a jury trial, defendant Ralph Levin 
was found guilty of possession of marijuana and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. He challenged his 
convictions before the Utah Court of Appeals, arguing 
that the trial court had erred in failing to suppress certain 
incriminating statements he made to police officers 
without the benefit of a Miranda [**1099] warning. In 
particular, he contended that the trial court had erred in 
concluding that the officers had not subjected him to 
"custodial interrogation." 
[*P3] The court of appeals upheld Levin's 
convictions. It held that the trial court had erred when it 
concluded that Levin was not interrogated but affirmed 
the trial court's determination that he was not "in 
custody." 4 In so doing, the court of appeals expressly 
applied an "abuse [***3] of discretion" standard to the 
custody determination.5 It did not specify the standard of 
review that it applied to the trial court's interrogation 
determination.6 On certiorari, Levin challenges the court 
of appeals custody determination, arguing that it was 
error for the court of appeals to apply the deferential 
"abuse of discretion" standard of review. 
4 State v. Levin, 2004 UTApp 396, PP11, 22-
23, 101 P.3d 846. 
5 Id.P7. 
6 Seeid.PP7, 11. 
[*P4] Because the "custody" and "interrogation" 
elements of a trial court's custodial interrogation 
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determination overlap and together serve to answer a 
single inquiry into whether a Miranda warning was 
necessary in a particular case, we address the standard of 
review for the trial court's custodial interrogation 
determination as a whole. A trial court's application of 
the legal concept of custodial interrogation to the facts of 
a particular case presents a mixed question of fact and 
law. Therefore, we select the appropriate [***4] 
standard of review using the general factors and policy 
considerations that we have discussed in State v. Pena 7 
and its progeny. However, we take this opportunity to 
revise our statement of the original four factors from 
Pena into a three-factor, policy-based balancing test. We 
then conclude that the three factors of this revised 
balancing test weigh in favor of reviewing for correctness 
a trial court's custodial interrogation determination. 
7 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
[*P5] Ultimately, the important policy of promoting 
uniformity in police officers' administration of Miranda 
warnings and in courts' application of Miranda to 
exclude a defendant's incriminating statements mandates 
greater appellate involvement in defining the concept of 
custodial interrogation as it applies to the facts of 
individual cases. Because the court of appeals applied a 
deferential standard in reviewing the trial court's 
determination that Levin was not in custody, we remand 
to the court [***5] of appeals for application of the 
"correctness" standard of review. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P6] Because our opinion is concerned only with 
defining the appropriate standard of review, we limit our 
discussion of the facts in this case. Although somewhat 
abbreviated, our factual discussion incorporates 
undisputed facts established at trial as well as those found 
by the trial court in connection with Levin's initial motion 
to dismiss. We consider undisputed facts from trial 
because at the beginning of the trial Levin made an 
appropriate continuing objection to the introduction of 
his incriminating statements by renewing his earlier 
motion to suppress those statements.8 
8 See State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1076 
(Utah 1987) (Durham, J., concurring separately, 
joined by Howe & Zimmerman, JJ.) (indicating 
that there will be sufficient notice of a continuing 
objection if counsel renews the objection at trial 
outside the presence of the jury). 
[*P7] Levin's convictions for drug offenses [***6] 
are based on evidence gathered during an approximately 
one-and-one-half hour traffic stop on the Provo Dike 
Road in a rural area near Utah Lake. Deputy Wayne 
Keith of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was on patrol 
when he noticed a convertible bearing expired 
registration tags parked on the side of the road. Three 
occupants were sitting in the convertible with the roof 
down. Without activating his lights or siren, Deputy 
Keith parked behind the convertible. He approached on 
foot and saw several open containers of alcohol in plain 
view inside the convertible. 
[*P8] Deputy Keith asked the convertible's 
occupants for identification. Levin was in [**1100] the 
driver's seat, Michael Winger was a passenger in the 
front seat, and Richard Johnson was sitting in the 
backseat. Deputy Keith had all three men step out of the 
vehicle and notified them that he was going to search for 
more open containers. His search of the vehicle's center 
console uncovered an odor of marijuana and a metal 
"socket" tool that had been fashioned into a pipe, which 
appeared to contain burnt and unburnt marijuana. Deputy 
Keith also found several small bags of marijuana in a 
backpack claimed by Johnson. 
[*P9] There [***7] is some dispute over the 
precise chronology of the following events, but the 
record establishes that Deputy Keith called in two 
deputies who were certified drug recognition experts. 
Because the vehicle belonged to Levin and he had been 
sitting in the driver's seat, Deputy Keith pulled Levin 
aside and personally subjected him to a sobriety test 
designed to identify alcohol impairment. He passed. The 
drug recognition experts then subjected Levin to 
additional field sobriety tests. Those officers determined 
that Levin had a fast pulse rate and a lack of convergence 
of the eyes. They informed Deputy Keith that they 
believed Levin was under the influence of marijuana. At 
some point, either before or after these tests, Deputy 
Keith asked Levin at least once about the socket, and 
Levin asserted that he knew nothing about it and had not 
smoked marijuana. Deputy Keith also patted Levin down 
but found no marijuana and no scent of marijuana on 
him. 
[*P10] However, after the drug recognition experts 
presented their conclusions to Deputy Keith, Deputy 
Keith pulled Levin aside and stated: "There's no doubt in 
my mind that you've been smoking marijuana." Deputy 
Keith's accusation was not phrased [***8] in the form of 
a question, and Deputy Keith was not "in Levin's face." 
Deputy Keith testified that he did not expect a response 
because Levin had already denied using marijuana. 
Nevertheless, Levin answered by saying that "he had 
taken a couple of hits" with Richard Johnson but that 
Michael Winger had not used any marijuana. He also 
added that they had smoked out of a pipe that the officers 
presumption. Patrick argues that the unrebutted presumption of 
reasonableness establishes his innocence of Scott's murder as a 
lawful defense of habitation. Thus, argues Patrick, the district 
court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict made at 
the close of the State's case-in-chief and at the close of all 
evidence. Patrick also argues that the lack of evidence 
rebutting the presumption renders the jury verdict against him 
unsupported by the evidence. 
We decline to review the district court's denial of 
Patrick's first motion for directed verdict, made at the close o 
the State's case-in-chief, because any error now asserted by 
Patrick was not preserved in the district court. Patriok^s 
arguments on appeal rely solely on the presiim^ fei^ m- created -fey—tj^ e 
defense of habitation statute, see id., while his first motion 
for directed verdict in the district court asserted only that the 
State had not met its burden on Patrick's separate claim of selfil-
defense, see id. § 76-2-402 f^ Qd^ 8l'**~~—*TTT order to preserve^n--
issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue before the 
district court in such a way that the court is placed on notice 
of potential error and then has the opportunity to correct or 
avoid the error." State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT 219, \ 10, 189 
A 
P.3d 85, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008). 
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had not located. At no time was Levin formally arrested, 
handcuffed, or given a Miranda warning, although he 
was issued a citation. 
[*P11] In addition to the investigation of Levin, the 
officers questioned the two passengers. The officers 
briefly questioned Winger about smoking marijuana. 
They read Johnson his Miranda rights and questioned 
him about the marijuana found in his backpack. Johnson 
admitted that he had been smoking with Levin, but later 
said that he had smoked the marijuana alone. When the 
officers had completed their investigation, they allowed 
Levin and his passengers to leave in the convertible. As 
the convertible started to drive away, one of the officers 
spotted a pipe located directly under the convertible. The 
officers stopped the convertible, and Deputy Keith asked 
[***9] if this was the pipe they had used to smoke. 
Johnson stated that it was. 
[*P12] Levin was later charged with possession and 
use of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and 
with having an open container in a vehicle. Levin pleaded 
no contest to the open container charge. With regard to 
the drug offenses, he pleaded not guilty and then moved 
to suppress the incriminating statements he had made to 
Deputy Keith, arguing that despite being subjected to 
custodial interrogation, he had not been given the 
required Miranda warning. The trial court denied the 
motion. It determined that Levin had not been in custody 
or subject to interrogation. At the commencement of trial, 
Levin renewed his motion, which the trial court again 
denied. Following the trial, a jury found Levin guilty of 
both possession of marijuana with a prior conviction and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. 
[*P13] On appeal, the court of appeals concluded 
that Levin had been subjected to "interrogation," but it 
applied a deferential "abuse of discretion" standard of 
review to the trial court's determination that Levin was 
not "in custody" and affirmed that determination. 9 It did 
not specify the standard [***10] of review that it applied 
to the trial court's interrogation determination. 
9 State v. Levin, 2004 UT App 396, PP 7, 11, 
22-23, 101P.3d846. 
[*P14] Levin now challenges the court of appeals' 
decision, arguing that the court of [**1101] appeals 
erred in reviewing the trial court's custody determination 
under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. We 
granted Levin's petition for certiorari to decide whether 
the court of appeals applied the correct standard of 
review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
section 78-2-2(5). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P15] On certiorari, we review for correctness the 
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the 
trial court. 10 The correctness of the court of appeals' 
decision turns, in part, on whether it accurately reviewed 
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of 
review. u 




[*P16] Levin argues that the court of appeals erred 
in reviewing the trial court's determination that he had 
not been "in custody" under an "abuse of discretion" 
standard. We agree. The importance of uniformity in 
Utah courts' application of Fifth Amendment Miranda 
protections leads us to conclude that Utah appellate 
courts should review for correctness trial courts' custodial 
interrogation determinations. 
[*P17] We will begin our analysis by describing the 
policy-based balancing test that guides our selection of a 
standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law. 
We will then apply this balancing test to the mixed 
question of custodial interrogation. 
I. WE DETERMINE THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FOR A MIXED QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW BY 
EMPLOYING A POLICY-BASED BALANCING TEST 
[*P18] In selecting the deferential standard of 
review that it applied to the trial court's "custody" 
determination in this case, the court of appeals engaged 
in an incomplete analysis of the factors that we discussed 
in State v. Pena n and did not adequately consider 
[***12] the policy implications that we highlighted in 
State v. Brake. n Given the lingering difficulties in the 
application of our standard of review jurisprudence, we 
take this opportunity to further discuss the role of policy 
in our selection of a standard of review and to refine our 
statement of the balancing test that we use in selecting a 
standard of review for a mixed question of fact and law. 
12 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
13 2004 UT95, P14, 103 P.3d 699. 
A. Standards of Review Apportion Power Between the 
Trial and Appellate Courts Based on the Courts' 
Institutional Competencies 
[*P19] We have previously explained that "[t]he 
primary function of a standard of review is to apportion 
ANALYSIS 
I. Utah's Defense of Habitation Statute 
Patrick's first set of arguments on appeal involve Utah's 
defense of habitation statute, Utah Code section 76-2-405. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405. Section 76-2-405 governs the use of 
force to defend a dwelling against unlawful entry or attack. See 
id. § 76-2-405(1). Section 76-2-405 further establishes, under 
certain circumstances, a presumption that a person who uses force 
to defend a dwelling has "acted reasonably and had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury." See 
id. § 76-2-405(2).3 Patrick raises several arguments on appeal 
in an attempt to establish that his shooting of Scott was 
justified as a defense of habitation as a matter of law. 
Each of Patrick's arguments invoking section 76-2-405 
presumes that the evidence presented to the jury gave rise to the 
presumption of reasonableness enunciated in section 76-2-405(2), 
and that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the 
3. Section 76-2-405(2) states, in its entirety: 
The person using force or deadly force in 
defense of habitation is presumed for the 
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to 
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry 
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use 
of force, or in a violent and tumultuous 
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or 
for the purpose of committing a felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405(2). 
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power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and 
appellate courts for determining an issue." u Standards of 
review should allocate discretion between the trial and 
appellate courts in a way that takes account of the 
"relative capabilities of each level of the court [***13] 
system to take evidence and make findings of fact in the 
face of conflicting evidence, on one hand, and to set 
binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other." 15 These 
considerations are critical in selecting a standard of 
review from along a spectrum of deference that runs from 
highly deferential review under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard on one end to completely nondeferential review 
under a "correctness" standard on the other end. ,6 
14 State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 
(Utah 1993). 
15 Id. at 1266. 
16 See Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
("[0]ne can visualize the traditional standard-of-
review scheme as a continuum of deference 
anchored at either end by the clearly erroneous 
and correction-of-error standards, which 
correspond with whether the issue is 
characterized as one of fact or of law."). 
[*P20] Because a trial court is in a better position 
to "judg[e] credibility and resolv[e] [**1102] 
evidentiary conflicts," an appellate [***14] court 
reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error. 17 
Conversely, an appellate court reviews a trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness because "a single trial 
judge is in an inferior position to determine what the 
legal content of [a legal concept] should be [whereas] a 
panel of appellate judges, with their collective experience 
and their broader perspective, is better suited to that 
task."18 Additionally, the published decisions of appellate 
courts "provid[e] state-wide standards that guide law 
enforcement and prosecutorial officials." 19 
17 Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
18 Id.; accord Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 
("[A]ppellate courts have traditionally been seen 
as having the power and duty to say what the law 
is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the 
jurisdiction."). 
19 Thurman, 846P.2d at 1277. 
[*P21] The analytical complexity of our standard of 
review is at its height when we review a trial court's 
[***15] application of a legal concept to a given set of 
facts. When we review so-called "mixed questions of fact 
and law," the considerations that favor a more-deferential 
standard of review and those that favor a less-deferential 
standard of review compete for dominance, and the 
amount of deference that results will vary according to 
the nature of the legal concept at issue. Mixed questions 
of fact and law involving different legal issues will often 
require different standards of review.20 
20 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938; see also Searle v. 
Milburn Irrig. Co., 2006 UT 16, P16, 133 P.3d 
382 ("The measure of discretion afforded varies, 
however, according to the issue being reviewed." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
[*P22] While we have said that, ultimately, "the 
legal effect of [the] facts is the province of the appellate 
courts," 21 our prior decisions recognize that, with regard 
to many mixed questions of fact and law, it is either not 
possible or not wise for an appellate [***16] court to 
define strictly how a legal concept is to be applied to 
each new set of facts. 22 Where the correct application of 
a legal concept is difficult to explain using a generally 
applicable standard, overinvolvement by an appellate 
court can lead to confusing and inconsistent 
pronouncements of the law. 23 We have recognized that 
the application of such a legal concept incorporates a de 
facto grant of discretion to the trial court, and, 
accordingly, we review the trial court's decision on the 
mixed question of fact and law with deference 
commensurate to that discretion.24 
21 Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 
(Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-40. 
23 Id. at 940. 
24 Id. at 937-39; State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, 
P27, 137P.3d787. 
[*P23] But with regard to certain mixed questions 
where uniform application is of high importance, as in 
the context of [***17] Fourth Amendment protections, 
we have held that policy considerations dictate that the 
application of the legal concept should be strictly 
controlled by the appellate courts. 25 Thus, if we 
determine that society's interest in establishing consistent 
statewide standards outweighs other considerations, we 
grant no discretion to the trial court, and we review the 
mixed question for correctness.26 
25 See Brake, 2004 UT 95, PP14-15, 103 P.3d 
699; see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, P26, 
63 P. 3d 650 (stating that there must be "statewide 
standards that guide law enforcement and 
prosecutorial officials" (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
26 See Brake, 2004 UT 95, PP14-15, 103 P.3d 
699. 
[*P24] We have described the varying levels of 
the evidence, and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it, to ensure that it provides a proper basis for conviction 
and is not so "inconclusive . . . that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" as to Patrick's guilt. Id. ^ 23 
(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P. 2d 
232, 236 (Utah 1992)). 
Patrick's arguments underestimate the jury's broad 
prerogative to evaluate the reasonableness of a defendant's 
actions for purposes of applying a justification defense. The 
breadth of the jury's role in evaluating justification defenses 
is illustrated in State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324 
(1944). In Law, the defendant was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter after fatally stabbing an unarmed man in a fight. 
See id. at 3 25-26. The defendant, who presented no evidence at 
trial, challenged the district court's denial of his request for 
a directed verdict at the close of the State's case-in-chief. 
See id. at 325. On appeal, the defendant argued that "in view of 
the disparity in the size and strength of the two men[5] and the 
4. (...continued) 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted.'" 
Id. f 16 n.7 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
5. "The testimony is that [the victim] was a well muscled man, 
weighing at least 22 0 pounds, 'six feet easy' and a powerful 
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discretion afforded trial courts in Pena and Brake using 
Professor Maurice Rosenberg's pasture metaphor, which 
describes the discretion given to a trial court on a 
particular mixed question as a pasture bounded by fences 
that represent [***18] the boundaries of the legal 
concept. 27 Because the established boundaries of each 
legal concept are unique, different mixed questions are 
associated with [**1103] pastures of different sizes. 28 
When a trial court stays within the pasture associated 
with a specific legal concept, it is free "to reach one of 
several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a 
particular set of facts without risking reversal." 29 
Discretion is broadest~and the standard of review is most 
deferential-when the application of a legal concept is 
highly fact dependant and variable. 30 Discretion is most 
confmed-and the standard of review is nondeferential-
when the legal concept is easily defined by appellate 
courts or when appellate courts erect strict fences for 
policy reasons.3l 
27 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38 (citing 
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the 
Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 635, 662-63 (1971)); Brake, 2004 UT 95, 
P14,103P.3d699. 
28 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38. 
29 Virgin, 2006 UT 29, P27, 137 P.3d 787 
(quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 937). 
30 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-40. 
31 See Brake, 2004 UT 95, PI 4, 103 P. 3d 699 
("Considerations of policy play a central part in 
the placement of discretionary fences.") 
B. The Test We Employ in Determining the Standard of 
Review for Mixed Questions Balances Policy 
Considerations Related to Courts' Institutional 
Competencies 
[*P25] In Pena and its progeny, we have articulated 
four factors to guide Utah appellate courts in the difficult 
task of selecting the appropriate standard of review for a 
mixed question of fact and law from the spectrum of 
possible levels of deference to a trial court. Most 
recently, we discussed these factors in State v. Virgin. 32 
However, this four-factor test has continued to cause 
some confusion. As will be explained, we therefore take 
this occasion to refine the test by eliminating a factor that 
has proven to be unhelpful and rephrasing the others to 
better reflect the purpose of the test. Our revised test 
considers the following factors: (1) the degree of variety 
and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule 
[***20] is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial 
court's application of the legal rule relies on "facts" 
observed by the trial judge, "such as a witness's 
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of 
the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record 
available to appellate courts;" and (3) other "policy 
reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to 
trial courts."33 
32 2006 UT 29, P28, 137 P.3d 787 ("[W]e 
quantify [a trial court's] discretion by weighing 
the following factors: (1) whether the facts to 
which the legal rule is to be applied are so 
complex and varying that no rule adequately 
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be 
spelled out; (2) whether the situation to which the 
legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new 
to the courts that appellate judges are unable to 
anticipate and articulate definitively what factors 
should be outcome determinative; (3) whether the 
trial judge has observed 'facts,' such as a witness's 
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the 
application of the law that cannot be adequately 
reflected in the record available to appellate 
courts; and (4) whether there are policy reasons 
that weigh for or against granting discretion to 
trial courts, such as when substantial 
constitutional rights are implicated." (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
[***21] 
33 Id. 
[*P26] As to the first factor, the greater the 
complexity and variety of the facts, the stronger the case 
for appellate deference. As to the second, the greater the 
importance of a trial court's credibility assessments that 
cannot be adequately reflected in the record, the stronger 
the case for appellate deference. The third factor requires 
that we take into consideration policy factors related to 
the degree of deference that should be applied. Even 
where a case for appellate deference is strong under the 
first two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless 
lead us to limit that deference.34 
34 See Brake, 2004 UT95, P14, 103 P.3d 699. 
[*P27] While the above balancing test reflects the 
principles relied upon in our opinions in Pena and its 
progeny and does not significantly depart from our prior 
statements regarding mixed questions of fact and law, we 
have rephrased the language of [***22] the factors and 
have eliminated the second Pena factor~the novelty of 
the situation. We have made these revisions to enhance 
the analytical consistency and clarity of the balancing test 
to be applied in placing different mixed questions along 
the spectrum of deference and discretion. 
afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury 
and may fully recount the evidence adduced and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom."). And, as with most other 
trial issues, a party must preserve arguments about the propriety 
of closing arguments by objecting to the offending statements at 
they are made. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 
94 P.3d 186 ("[W]e generally will not examine the 
State's closi^r^y^rgu^^nt if the defendant failed to timely object 
to it><^ Ty") . Here, Patrick did not preserve his arguments 
for appeal by raising a timely and adequate objection. 
During closing arguments, the State addressed Scott's entry 
into the Patrick residence and argued that it was not unlawful. 
Patrick now complains that the State misrepresented the facts by 
asserting that " [tjhere is nothing in any of the evidence but 
[Patrick's] statements that this entry was unlawful." [Blue pQ 
^A2^J^^^2QS-^L^.] Patrick also argues that the State misstated 
the law when it argued that Scott's permissive entry into the 
Patrick home could not have become unlawful upon Scott's refusal 
to leave as directed, but instead could be deemed unlawful only 
if it was "unlawful at the time he crosse [d] the threshold [of 
the Patrick home]." Patrick's only objection at the time 
was that the State's argument was "a misstatement of the law." 
The district court overruled Patrick's objection, noting that it 
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[*P28] As the first three factors for determining the 
standard of review have been [**1104] phrased in Pena 
and its progeny, their application suggested only "yes" or 
"no" answers, 35 making the factors ill-suited to use in a 
balancing test. Further, by quoting these first three Pena 
factors verbatim in the process of transforming them into 
a balancing test, we have in many of our earlier 
statements of the balancing test overemphasized their 
importance and artificially divorced them from our 
central concern with the policy implications of selecting a 
more- deferential or less-deferential standard of review.36 
In contrast, we have recently reaffirmed the centrality of 
policy considerations in our decision in Brake 37 and 
treated policy considerations as a "fourth" Pena factor in 
State v. Virgin.38 Thus, to clarify the appropriate test, we 
have rephrased the factors here in a manner [***23] that 
better reflects their usefulness in selecting a standard of 
review from somewhere along the spectrum of deference. 
35 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 (listing three 
circumstances in which the trial court should be 
given discretion, namely: "(i) when the facts to 
which the legal rule is to be applied are so 
complex and varying that no rule adequately 
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be 
spelled out; (ii) when the situation to which the 
legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new 
to the courts that appellate judges are unable to 
anticipate and articulate definitively what factors 
should be outcome determinative; and (iii) when 
the trial judge has observed 'facts,' such as a 
witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to 
the application of the law that cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record available to 
appellate courts" (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 
27, at 662-63)). 
36 See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, 
Inc., 2000 UT 83, PP10, 12, 12 P.3d 580 
(quoting and applying the original three Pena 
factors and then mentioning in a later paragraph 
that there are "no policy reasons outweighing" the 
first three factors suggesting a deferential 
standard). 
r***24] 
37 2004 UT95, PP14-15, 103 P.3d 699. 
38 2006 UT29, P28, 137 P.3d 787. 
[*P29] In the process of rephrasing the test, we 
have dropped the "novelty" factor because it has rarely, if 
ever, proven to be helpful to our analysis. As it was 
phrased in Pena, the novelty factor considered whether 
"the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied 
is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are 
unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what 
factors should be outcome determinative." 39 The 
situations in which this factor required more deferential 
review were unclear. Our cases demonstrate that legal 
issues involving situations that are completely new to the 
appellate courts are rare. Furthermore, where a situation 
is novel, it is not self-evident that the appellate courts 
should restrain themselves from exercising searching 
review and should instead take a wait-and-see approach 
to establishing a legal test. In the language of the pasture 
metaphor, we are not convinced that we should 
necessarily refrain from establishing fences that restrain 
trial courts simply [***25] because a situation is novel 
and anticipating the future development of the law may 
be difficult. 
39 869 P.2d at 939. 
[*P30] Furthermore, because this "novelty" factor 
was prominent in the original Pena test despite its rare 
applicability, it has often proven unwieldy, cluttered the 
analysis, or been ignored. For example, we have 
sometimes stated that the situation presented was not 
"new," but then have addressed whether we could 
articulate "outcome determinative factors." *° The later 
inquiry is substantially the same as the inquiry that we 
make under the first factor, namely: the degree to which 
the variety and complexity of the facts make it difficult to 
articulate a legal test or factors that are outcome 
determinative. Such mixing of the separate analytical 
inquiries from the first and second original Pena factors 
has [**1105] only served to confuse the analysis and 
may have led appellate courts to place too much weight 
on the difficulty of articulating a rule. Ultimately, in the 
rare [***26] instances where this "novelty of the 
situation" factor may be important, it could fall under the 
umbrella of other policy considerations. 
40 See Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, 
PI 7, 133 P. 3d 382 (concluding that "at least 
some deference should be granted to the district 
court's application of the law to the facts" where it 
was "exceedingly difficult to craft a uniform rule 
neatly applicable in all situations"); Butler, 
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest 
Pipeline Operating, 2004 UT 67, P47, 98 P.3d 1 
(concluding that the second factor supported 
additional deference to a trial court's beneficial 
use determination, even though the beneficial use 
doctrine "has roots dating back to the turn of the 
last century"); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 
1245 (Utah 1998) (concluding that although "the 
unjust enrichment doctrine has ancient roots," the 
second factor supported a "broad degree of 
discretion in applying the law" where "the court's 
argued on appeal, and thus we do not consider them. See State v. 
Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 22, 147 P.3d 448 ("Other than for 
jurisdictional reasons [the court of appeals] should not normally 
search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse a 
[district] court judgment." (alterations in original) (quotation 
omitted)); State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT 219, % 10, 189 P.3d 85,>j\ 
cert, denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008) ((stating requirement 
"issues must be preserved for appeal by presentation to the 
.strict court 
The district court admitted the challenged evidence under 
rule 4 04(a), and Patrick has neither preserved nor argued any 
error in the district court's application of that rule. 
Accordingly, we will not disturb the district court's ruling. 
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct ' 
Finally, Patrick argues that the State misstated the law and 
the facts in its closing argument. Generally, parties have wide 
latitude in closing arguments to characterize the evidence and 
the proper application of the law to the evidence. See, e.g., 
State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989) ("Counsel is 
9. (...continued) 
character was not in issue. See id. ff 6-15. We note that Leber 
was issued well after the district court's decision in this case 
and is currently under review by the Utah Supreme Court upon writ 
of certiorari, and we do not rely on its substantive reasoning in 
reaching our decision today. 
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ability to state clearly the outcome-determinative 
factors remains elusive"). 
[***27] [*P31] In making these changes to the 
way that we articulate the established standard, our intent 
is to improve upon our statement of the test that we apply 
to mixed questions of fact and law without changing its 
core substance. As before, our goal in applying the above 
balancing test is to allocate tasks between the trial and 
appellate courts based on their institutional roles and 
competencies. 
II. WHETHER A DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECTED 
TO CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION IS A MIXED 
QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW THAT WE 
REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS. 
[*P32] Having set forth the balancing test to be 
used in selecting an appropriate standard of review for a 
mixed question of fact and law, we now apply the test to 
answer the question at hand; namely, what is the standard 
appellate courts apply in reviewing a trial court's 
determination that a person was or was not subjected to 
custodial interrogation for the purpose of Fifth 
Amendment Miranda protections? To do so, we will first 
outline the legal concept of custodial interrogation in the 
context of our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. We will 
then apply the three-factor balancing test to the mixed 
question of custodial interrogation, discussing [***28] 
each of the three factors in turn. 
A. The Legal Concept of Custodial Interrogation 
[*P33] To apply the three-factor mixed question 
test set forth above, we must first understand the legal 
concept of custodial interrogation, which trial courts 
apply to the facts of each case. The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantees that a person 
shall not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself." We protect this right by 
excluding from a defendant's criminal trial any 
incriminating statement that the defendant made to police 
officers while under custodial interrogation if the officers 
did not give a Miranda warning.41 
41 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 
300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S. 
Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 
[*P34] Generally, custodial interrogation consists 
of questioning or use of other techniques of persuasion 
"'initiated by law enforcement officers after a person 
[***29] has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way.'"42 Thus, custodial interrogation occurs where there 
is both (1) custody or other significant deprivation of a 
suspect's freedom and (2) interrogation. These two 
elements are interrelated. 
42 Innis, 446 U.S. at 298-99 (quoting Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); accord Stansbury v. 
California, 511 US. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 
128L.Ed. 2d293 (1994). 
[*P35] We often describe the first element as an 
inquiry into whether a suspect was "in custody." A 
person is in custody when "[the person's] freedom of 
action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal 
arrest." 43 The inquiry is objective and considers "how a 
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have 
understood his situation." u A suspect may understand 
himself or herself to be in custody based either on 
physical evidence or on the nature of the officer's 
instructions and [***30] questions. Therefore, we focus 
on both the evidence of restraint and on objective 
evidence of the officers' intentions. 45 As stated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 
[**1106] [A]n officer's views concerning 
the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs 
concerning the potential culpability of the 
individual being questioned, may be one 
among many factors that bear upon the 
assessment whether that individual was in 
custody, but only if the officer's views or 
beliefs were somehow manifested to the 
individual under interrogation and would 
have affected how a reasonable person in 
that position would perceive his or her 
freedom to leave.46 
43 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US. 420, 440, 
104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah 1996). 
44 Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); accord Mirquet, 914 
P.2datll47. 
45 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; Salt Lake 
presumption. Patrick argues that the unrebutted presumption of 
reasonableness establishes his innocence of Scott's murder as a 
lawful defense of habitation. Thus, argues Patrick, the district 
court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict made at 
the close of the State's case-in-chief and at the close of all 
evidence. Patrick also argues that the lack of evidence 
rebutting the presumption renders the jury verdict against him 
unsupported by the evidence. 
We decline to review the district court's denial of 
Patrick's first motion for directed verdict, made at the close of 
the State's case-in-chief, because any error now asserted by 
Patrick was not preserved in the district court. Patirick's 
arguments on appeal rely solely on the presumption created by the 
defense of habitation statute, see id., while his first motion 
for directed verdict in the district court asserted only that the 
State had not met its burden on Patrick's separate claim of self-
defense, see id. § 76-2-402 (2008) . "In order to preserve an 
issue for appeal, a defendant must raise the issue before the 
district court in such a way that the court is placed on notice 
of potential error and then has the opportunity to correct or 
avoid the error." State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT$2i9, f 10, 189 
P.3d 85, cert, denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008). 
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City v Carrier, 664 P 2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 
1983). 
46 Stansbury, 511 US at 325. 
[*P36] For instance, when investigatory 
questioning shifts to accusatory questioning, the 
existence of custody is likely because this often indicates 
to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave. By 
making accusations, the police officer indicates that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it.47 In Salt 
Lake City v Carrier,48 we set forth four factors that aid in 
determining whether a defendant is "in custody" for 
purposes of the Miranda protections: 49 "(1) the site of 
interrogation, (2) whether the investigation focused on 
the accused, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest 
were present, and (4) the length and form of 
interrogation"50 
47 See Mirquet, 914 P 2d at 1148 (indicating 
that accusatory questioning is relevant, but does 
not necessarily establish a coercive environment), 
Carner, 664 P 2d at 1170 (recognizing import of 
accusatory statements); State v Snyder, 860 P 2d 
351, 357 (Utah Ct App 7995Xsame). 
r***321 
48 664 P 2d 1168 (Utah 1983). 
49 See Mirquet, 914 P 2d at 1147 n2 
(explaining that although Carner was decided 
under Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, the same test applies under the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution) 
50 Carner, 664 P 2d at 1171. 
[*P37] Once a trial court determines that the 
defendant was "in custody," it must then decide whether 
the incriminating statement was the product of 
interrogation 51 Interrogation is "either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent" and it 
incorporates any "words or actions on the part of police 
officers that they should have known were reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response "52 
51 Rhode Island v Inms, 446 US 291, 298-
301, 100 S Ct 1682, 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980). 
52 Id at 300-02 
B Application of the Balancing [***33] Test to the 
Mixed Question of Custodial Interrogation 
[*P38] Applymg our three-factor balancing test to 
the legal concept of custodial interrogation, we first 
consider the degree of complexity and variety in the facts 
that are involved in custodial interrogation 
determinations. We have said that additional deference to 
the trial court is warranted where the facts "are so 
complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing 
the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out." 53 
53 Pena, 869 P 2d at 939. 
[*P39] We initially note that the rules defining both 
the custody and interrogation prongs of custodial 
interrogation are well defined and adequate. We set forth 
the four Carner factors for determining custody more 
than twenty years ago and they continue to guide us 
today Furthermore, in light of the objective nature of 
both prongs of the custodial interrogation test, the 
relevant facts are typically not particularly complex and 
can usually be identified with specificity. [***34] The 
location of the interrogation usually can be found in the 
record, and the significance of the location is often 
intuitive. Places that are confined or isolated are more 
likely to indicate custody than those that are public and 
open 54 The length of the interrogation can usually be 
closely approximated and compared with the length of 
ordinary investigative detentions As for indicia of arrest, 
we generally look to whether handcuffs, drawn [**1107] 
guns, locked doors, threats, or coercion are present. 55 
The question of whether the defendant was a "focus" of 
the investigation depends on whether the investigators' 
actions indicated that they had identified the defendant as 
a likely criminal culprit. Finally, the facts that are 
relevant to the objective legal question of whether the 
police officers should have known that their words or 
actions were likely to elicit an incriminating response 
consist of the words or actions themselves, their meaning, 
and their likely impact In sum, although the facts relating 
to custodial interrogation will vary from case to case, this 
first factor of the balancing test weighs against appellate 
deference because such facts typically are not "so 
complex and [***35] varying that no rule adequately 
addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled 
out."56 
54 Compare Mirquet, 914 P 2d at 1148 (noting 
that one factor indicating custody was location of 
questioning inside the confines of the front seat of 
a police car) with Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 
420, 438, 104 S Ct 3138, 82 L Ed 2d 317 
(1984) (suggesting that because the typical traffic 
stop is conducted where passersby may witness 
the interaction, a motorist does not feel 
completely at the mercy of the police). 
55 See State v Wood, 868 P 2d 70, 83 (Utah 
1993); Carner, 664P2dat 1171. 
56 See Pena, 869 P 2d at 939. 
[*P40] Second, we consider the degree to which the 
application of the legal rule relies on "facts" observed by 
ANALYSIS 
I. Utah's Defense of Habitation Statute 
Patrick's first set of arguments on appeal involve Utah's 
defense of habitation statute, Utah Code section 76-2-405. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405. Section 76-2-405 governs the use of 
force to defend a dwelling against unlawful entry or attack. See 
id. § 76-2-405(1). Section 76-2-405 further establishes, under 
certain circumstances, a presumption that a person who uses force 
to defend a dwelling has "acted reasonably and had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury." See 
id. § 76-2-405(2).3 Patrick raises several arguments on appeal 
in an attempt to establish that his shooting of Scott was 
justified as a defense of habitation as a matter of law. 
Each of Patrick's arguments invoking section 76-2-405 
presumes that the evidence presented to the jury gave rise to the 
presumption of reasonableness enunciated in section 76-2-405(2), 
and that there was insufficient evidence to rebut the 
3. Section 76-2-405(2) states, in its entirety: 
The person using force or deadly force in 
defense of habitation is presumed for the 
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to 
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry 
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use 
of force, or in a violent and tumultuous 
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or 
for the purpose of committing a felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405(2). 
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the trial judge-such as a witness's appearance and 
demeanor-that cannot be adequately reflected in the 
record available to appellate courts. The greater the 
significance of these types of facts, [***36] the greater 
the case for appellate deference. Although the trial court's 
superior position to make credibility determinations can 
be important with respect to custodial interrogations, 
given the objective nature of the test to be applied, it is 
typically less important than in other contexts The 
necessary facts regarding the site, length, and focus of the 
interrogation and the indicia of arrest are facts that 
generally can be adequately reflected in a cold record. 
Similarly, facts that show that a police officer's statement 
or act is one that the officer should have known would 
likely elicit an incriminating response generally can be 
identified with specificity and written into the record 
Thus, this second factor of the balancing test does not 
weigh in favor of granting greater discretion to the trial 
court. 
[*P41] Third, and lastly, we consider whether 
policy considerations favor more or less appellate control 
over the factual application of the concept of custodial 
interrogation 57 Because the custodial interrogation 
inquiry is the crux of the test that determines when a 
suspect's Fifth Amendment right must be protected 
through a Miranda warning, there is a strong [***37] 
interest in promoting clarity and consistency in our state's 
jurisprudence Clarity and consistency in our courts' 
application of the Miranda protections will benefit the 
accused by offering predictable constitutional 
protections, and it will benefit the State by providing 
better guidance to the police officers in their 
administration of Miranda warnings Thus, the third 
factor in our balancing test weighs strongly in favor of 
nondeferential review. 
57 State v Virgin, 2006 UT 29, P28, 137 P 3d 
787 (citing Pena, 869 P 2d at 938-39). 
[*P42] Our application of the balancing test leads 
us to conclude that nondeferential appellate review of 
custodial interrogation determinations is mandated. 
Specifically, we hold that the first two factors of the 
balancing test do not favor deferential review because the 
facts involved m a custodial interrogation determination 
are usually relatively simple, and the custodial 
interrogation determination does not typically rely 
heavily on credibility [***38] determinations or other 
subtle factual determinations that are the prerogative of 
the trial court. Moreover, even if the application of these 
factors made a stronger case for deferential appellate 
review, they would be outweighed by the need for 
uniformity in the custodial interrogation standard. 
[*P43] Our reasoning on these points is consistent 
with that from our recent decision in State v Brake. 58 In 
Brake, we decided that we would review for correctness 
mixed questions of fact and law in the context of Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure cases.59 We grounded this 
decision in the substantial constitutional issues at stake, 
determining that the variety of fact patterns in those 
search [**1108] and seizure cases was not 
unmanageable and did not outweigh the need for uniform 
legal rules. m We concluded that, in the context of Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure cases, the need for a 
consistent body of case law that would set statewide 
standards demanded that we review each of these 
determinations for correctness.61 
58 2004 UT95, PP14-15, 103 P 3d 699. 
59 Id 
60 Id 
61 Id, see also State v Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 
P25, 63 P 3d 650, State v Warren, 2003 UT 36, 
PI 2, 78 P 3d 590. 
[*P44] Like the law governing Fourth Amendment 
protections, custodial interrogation determinations define 
the boundaries of a substantial constitutional right—the 
Fifth Amendment right to avoid self mcnmination--and 
should be defined and applied uniformly for the benefit 
of the State as well as for the benefit of the criminal 
suspect As in Brake, these concerns outweigh 
countervailing factors and require nondeferential review 
of this mixed question of fact and law Indeed, the facts 
that we consider in the context of a Fifth Amendment 
custodial interrogation determination are generally 
simpler and more manageable than the facts that go into 
determining search and seizure issues under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
[*P45] Finally, we note that although we have not 
previously applied an express balancing analysis to the 
mixed question of custodial interrogation, our 
announcement of a correctness standard of review for 
[***40] custodial interrogation determinations is 
consistent with our prior precedent Since we directly 
addressed standards of review for mixed questions in 
Pena, this court has discussed the standard of review for 
the mixed question of custodial interrogation in only one 
case, State v Wood.62 In Wood, we stated that when facts 
are undisputed we review custodial determinations for 
correctness. 63 While our correctness standard does 
conflict with the deferential standard applied in some of 
our court of appeals' cases, M that court has never 
expressly considered the policy implications discussed in 
Brake or conducted a full balancing analysis using the 
undisputed facts of the case gave rise to a presumption of the 
reasonableness of his actions under the defense of habitation 
statute and that the State had failed to rebut that presumption. 
The district court again denied Patrick's motion, stating that 
"it would be improper for the court to take this out of the 
jury's hands because there is some evidence [of guilt]" and the 
amount of evidence required to defeat a directed verdict motion 
"is very minimal." [Last day transcript 137:19-22] 
Both sides proceeded to make their closing arguments, each 
of which addressed the factors that, if established, would give 
rise to a presumption of reasonableness of Patrick's actions 
under the defense of habitation statute. In addressing whether 
Scott's entry into Patrick's home was unlawful, one of the 
factors that would create a presumption, the State asserted that 
Scott's entry could not be deemed unlawful if his initial entry 
was permissive even if Scott subsequently ignored Kay and 
Patrick's demands that he leave. As characterized by the State, 
" [a]n unlawful entry is unlawful at the time he crosses the 
threshold." At this point in the State's closing, Patrick 
objected, stating as the grounds for his objection merely that 
the State had made a "misstatement of the law." Patrick did not 
offer any argument as to what the misstatement of lav/ might be, 
nor did he raise any objection that the State was misrepresenting 
the facts in evidence. The district court overruled the 
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factors that we discussed in Pena and its progeny. In 
sum, our application of the balancing test to the mixed 
question of custodial interrogation, particularly in light of 
the policy favoring uniformity in the application of Fifth 
Amendment Miranda protections, leads us to conclude 
that we should apply a correctness standard for such 
questions. 
62 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993). 
63 Id. at 83. 
r***4;u 
64 See State v. Teuscher, 883 P. 2d 922, 929 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (determining that a trial 
court's custody determination should be granted 
some deference because the inquiry is fact-
sensitive); see also State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 
271, P7, 987 P.2d 1281 (granting a measure of 
discretion to trial court's custodial interrogation 
determination); State v. Straus berg, 895 P. 2d 
831, 834 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (granting a 
measure of discretion to trial court's custody 
determination "unless such determination exceeds 
established legal boundaries"). But see State v. 
Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(reviewing for correctness whether, given the 
underlying facts, defendant "was in custody for 
Miranda purposes"). 
CONCLUSION 
[*P46] We hold that custodial interrogation 
determinations should be reviewed for correctness. We 
arrive at this conclusion by applying a revised three-
factor balancing test that is based on the factors and 
policy considerations discussed in State v. Pena and its 
progeny. First, the [***42] facts attendant to custodial 
interrogation determinations are generally not so 
complex and varied as to preclude the articulation of a 
rule. Second, credibility determinations generally do not 
weigh heavily in such determinations. And third, there is 
a strong policy interest in establishing predictable 
standards to guide both the courts and police officers in 
their administration of Fifth Amendment Miranda 
protections. Having answered the question that is before 
us on certiorari, we remand to the court of appeals with 
directions to apply a correctness standard to the trial 
court's determination that Levin was not subjected to 
custodial interrogation and for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
[**1109] [*P47] Chief Justice Durham, Associate 
Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and Justice 
Nehring concur in Justice Durrant's opinion. 
Patrick was charged with murder and bound over for trial. 
Both sides filed pre-trial motions regarding character evidence, 
with the State seeking to admit prior acts by Patrick and Patrick 
seeking to admit prior acts by Scott. In a written ruling issued 
on May 26, 2005, the district court allowed the State to present 
evidence of Patrick's prior acts involving Kay, Scott, and Cindy, 
ruling that "the issue is not whether these facts are to show a 
propensity to commit the offense, but relate to his self defense 
issue, which by its nature raises the issue of peacefulness and 
reasonableness of [Patrick's] conduct." The district court 
denied Patrick's request to admit evidence of Scott's two prior 
felony sex offenses, but allowed Patrick to present evidence of 
Scottfs prior acts to the extent those acts might relate to 
Patrick's state of mind at the time of the shooting. 
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, which relied 
primarily on Kay's testimony about the shooting, Patrick moved 
for a directed verdict on his claim of self-defense. Patrick's 
motion asserted that the State had failed in its burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Patrick had not acted in self-
defense. The district court denied Patrick's motion. 
At the close of all of the evidence, Patrick again made a 
motion for a directed verdict asserting a failure by the State to 
disprove self-defense. Patrick's motion also asserted that the 
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